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Dear Mr. Goldin:
The NASA Advisory Council has completed the
independent assessment of the International Space Station (ISS)
program that you directed be done. At our meeting on March
19, 1998, Jay Chabrow presented the £mdings of the Cost
Assessment and Validation (CAV) Task Force of the Advisory
Committee on the International Space Station (ACISS).
The Task Force assessed the validity of NASA's
projections and provided its own estimation of the remaining
cost and schedule for ISS completion. The Task Force members
have considerable experience and broad knowledge of all aspects
of program management and cost forecasting of technical
development programs. The Council found the methodology
and results to be credible.
The CAV Task Force reported that the most probable
schedule slip is 24 months with a range of 10 months to 38
months. It also determined that additional funding in the range of
$130 to $250 million annually will be necessary through
completion of assembly. The Council believes these findings to
be consistent with the level of growth that would be expected
given the significant complexity of the ISS program.
Mr. Goldin, please be assured that the enclosed
assessment is truly independent; neither the ACISS nor the
Council has influenced or altered it.
The documents that NASA provided to Congress have
been reviewed for consistency with the earlier drafts on which
the CAV Task Force assessment was based. The assessment of
those areas of Congressional concern is unchanged and is
reflected in the report.
Sincerely,
Bradford W. Parkinson
Enclosures
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12921 Esworthy Road
Potomac, Maryland 20878
(301) 926-2318
April 21, 1998
Dr. Bradford Parkinson
Chairman
NASA Advisory Council
NASA Headquarters
Washington, D.C. 20546
Dear Brad,
The Cost Assessment and Validation Task Force (CAV), with Mr. Jay
Chabrow as Chairman, was established at the request of the NASA Administrator.
The CAV charter was to perform an independent review and assessment of costs,
budgets, and partnership performance on the International Space Station (ISS)
program and to provide advice and recommendations. Enclosed is the CAV final
report dated April 15, 1998.
The Advisory Committee on the International Space Station (ACISS)
reviewed the CAV results at a committee meeting on March 12, 1998 and has
completed a review of the final report. Special actions were taken by the ACISS
to ensure that the CAV review and assessment was independent. ACISS
comments from both reviews were provided to the CAV, and the Task Force had
total authority to determine disposition. The CAV final report is truly an
independent review and assessment.
Task Force members are experienced professionals with significant
experience in the management of major space projects. Their conclusions are
based on fact finding by participation in NASA meetings and visits to facilities of
major ISS participants, analyses performed by the CAV, and the collective
judgment of the members. CAV conclusions include a likely delay in the
completion of the ISS assembly from one to three years beyond December 2003
and additional annual funding of between $130 million and $250 million relative to
the ISS fiscal year 1999 budget to Congress. The CAV findings are reasonable
and credible given a program of such complexity.
Sincerely,
Chaizfnan, Ad'#isory Committee on the International Space Station
Enclosure
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National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington D.C. 20546
April15,1998
Dr. Bradford Parkinson
Chair
NASA Advisory Council
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, DC 20546
Mr. A. Thomas Young
Chair
Advisory Committee on the International Space Station
12921 Esworthy Rd.
Potomac, Maryland 20878
Dear Brad and Tom:
The Cost Assessment and Validation Task Force has completed its independent review and
assessment of the International Space Station (ISS). You will find the report content is
largely consistent with the overall findings briefed to the NASA Advisory Committee on the
ISS and the NASA Advisory Council at earlier meetings. The enclosed report contains the
specific analyses from which the overall assessment was generated.
Two of the more significant findings in the report are estimates that the cost of the ISS will
increase from $130 million to $250 million each year over the NASA fiscal year 1999
budget submittal, and that the program will extend beyond its current schedule by one to
three years.
I can not say enough about the individual people who contributed their considerable time and
vast experience to the generation of this report. We are extremely confident in the accuracy
of our findings and hope that this report contributes to a better understanding of this vital
space-based international resource.
Sincerely, / /_
 .a row
"---._airman. Cost Assessment and
Validation Task Force
Enclosure
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Report of the
Cost Assessment and Validation Task Force
on the International Space Station
1.0 Executive Summary
The Cost Assessment and Validation (CAV)
Task Force was established for independent
review and assessment of cost, schedule and
partnership performance on the International
Space Station (ISS) Program. The CAV Task
Force has made the following key findings:
The International Space Station Program
has made notable and reasonable progress
over the past four years in defining and
executing a very challenging and
technically complex effort.
The Program size, complexity, and
ambitious schedule goals were beyond
that which could be reasonably achieved
within the $2.1 billion annual cap or
$17.4 billion total cap.
• A number of critical risk elements are
likely to have an adverse impact on the
International Space Station cost and
schedule.
• The schedule uncertainty associated with
Russian implementation of joint
Partnership agreements is the major
threat to the ISS Program.
• The Fiscal Year (FY) 1999 budget
submission to Congress is not adequate to
execute the baseline ISS Program, cover
normal program growth, and address the
known critical risks. Additional annual
funding of between $130 million and $250
million will be required.
• Completion of ISS assembly is likely to be
delayed from one to three years beyond
December 2003.
1.1 Background
The International Space Station emanates
from a 1993 NASA cost reduction-based
redesign of the Space Station Freedom.
NASA committed to build the new design
within a $2.1 billion annual funding constraint
and at a total cost to completion of $17.4
billion. Now, nearly five years later, hardware
manufacturing for many of the first U.S.-
developed flight elements has been
completed_ The program is well into the test
and integration phase, preparing for the start
of deployment later this year.
Progress on the ISS Program has been
achieved by overcoming a variety of
challenges. In 1997, cost growth and delivery
delays, both in the U.S. and abroad, made
considerable news. In May 1997, the ISS First
Element Launch (FEL) was deferred by seven
months from November 1997 to June 1998.
In September 1997, after coordination with
the International Partners on out-year ISS
assembly flights, a new manifest was released
that reflected a slip of over a year in
completion of ISS assembly. These events
and others have raised questions regarding the
total cost and schedule for ISS development
and operations.
In September 1997, the NASA Administrator
asked Dr. Brad Parkinson to establish a Cost
Assessment and Validation Task Force,
reporting through the Advisory Committee on
the International Space Station (ACISS) to the
NASA Advisory Council, for independent
review and assessment of cost, schedule and
partnership performance on the ISS Program.
The letter of request is in Appendix A. The
objective of the Task Force, chaired by Mr.
Jay Chabrow, was to provide advice and
recommendations for improvement of the ISS
business structure and cost management
practices and to determine the total cost over
the life of the Program. The Task Force
Termsof Referencearein AppendixB.
On October 6, 1997, the Senate-House
ConferenceCommitteesubmittedConference
Report105-297.This reportspecifiedcertain
NASA reportingrequirementsto Congressas
a precondition to the March 1998
Congressionalreleaseof $851,300,000in FY
1998ISSfunding.
Thefollowing itemswererequiredof NASA
byCongress:
adetailedplan,jointly agreedto by NASA
and the Prime contractor, for the
contractor'smonthlystaffinglevelsthrough
completionof development,andevidence
that thecontractorhasheld to the agreed-
uponde-staffingplanthroughthefirst four
monthsof fiscalyear1998,
a detailed schedule,jointly agreedto by
NASA and the Prime contractor, for
deliveryof hardware,andNASA'splansfor
launchingthehardware,
a detailed report on the status of
negotiationsbetweenNASAandthePrime
contractorfor changesto the contractfor
sustainingengineeringandspares,with the
expectationthatNASA wouldadhereto the
self-imposedannualcapof $1.3billion for
operationsafterconstructionis complete,
a detailed analysis by a qualified
independenthird party of the cost and
scheduleprojectionsrequiredfor theabove
items, either verifying NASA's data or
explainingreasonsfor lackof verification.
NASA requestedthe CAV Task Force to
perform this independentassessment,either
verifying NASA's dataor explainingreasons
for lackof verification.Thelettermakingthat
request is in Appendix C, and the Task
Force'sassessmentis in AppendixD.
Six additional expertsmade up the Task
Force. Their biographiesarein AppendixE.
The memberswere selectedto obtain a
diversityof expertisein programmanagement,
cost estimationand formulation,technology
development,and cost and schedulerisk
assessment,so that all aspectsof the ISS
Program could be analyzedand assessed.
Task Force members have backgrounds in
industry, the federal government, and the
military and have experience in large-scale
aerospace and other technology development
programs.
1.2 CAV Task Force Organization and
Process
Three members of the CAV Task Force, who
were serving as technical consultants on the
ACISS, attended detailed budget reviews at
each of the Prime contractor's production sites
in October, 1997. The official kick-off
meeting of the Cost Assessment and
Validation Task Force was on November 6,
1997
Since the team's initial meeting, members of
the CAV Task Force have met almost weekly.
The team was given open access to every facet
of NASA's ISS Program. Fact-finding trips
were made for meetings with ISS Program
management, line support organization
personnel, and the Program's Prime
Contractor. The CAV Task Force met with
representatives of the European Space Agency
(ESA) and the Russian Space Agency (RSA)
at their production sites to gain first-hand
knowledge of their performance.
Representatives of Alenia Aerospazio, Turin,
Italy, who are responsible for the delivery of
several U.S. and European elements also
briefed the CAV Task Force on their progress.
The Task Force's fact-finding focused on
major aspects of past performance trends,
current performance, and estimated
projections by the ISS Program. The main
thrust was to identify and evaluate major risk
elements that would likely contribute to
further cost growth and schedule slip.
Pertinent information was gathered through
summary and detailed status briefings, special
topics briefings, site visits, and personal
2
interviews with ISS program and line
managementand support personnel,and in
conversations with other government
oversight organizations. The compiled
informationwasreviewedto assessthemajor
impediments which could affect timely
completionof theISS.
1.3 Findings
1.3.1 Development
The ISS Program has been diligent and
resourceful in managing the unique challenges
of this complex venture given the significant
complexity and uncertainty of international
involvement and the difficult task of staying
within annual and total funding caps
established prior to final Program content
definition. The Program has not incurred any
extraordinary technical or programmatic
"show stoppers" to date. Although cost and
schedule growth have occurred, the magnitude
of such growth has not been unusual, even
when compared with other developmental
programs of lesser complexity.
The $2.1 billion annual funding limitation has
resulted in spread-out procurements, deferred
and untimely work, and inadequate
contingency planning, all of which have
induced schedule delays and have increased
cost. NASA's cost and schedule plans have
been optimistic from the beginning of the
Program and continue to be so today. Budget
and reserve levels have been, and continue to
be, inadequate for a program of this size,
complexity, and development uncertainty
despite NASA's past contentions that the total
funding level is adequate. It could
alternatively be stated that the Program has
more content than it has funds available to
achieve.
In the Task Force's opinion, Program de-
staffing goals do not adequately account for:
work yet to be accomplished, mitigation of
current and potential cost and schedule risks,
and the retention of an appropriate skill mix
through completion of development. The Task
Force analyzed ISS de-staffing plans for
several prior years and found they were not
achieved for reasons similar to those noted
above. Current development de-staffing plans
require Prime contractor off-loads at a greater
rate than all previous plans. Past trends
clearly indicate that this is not a realistic
assumption. Therefore, the Task Force
believes that attempting to adhere to the
current de-staffing plans is unreasonable and
will introduce additional cost and schedule
risks that could otherwise be avoided.
Management challenges will remain large and
diverse considering the significant on-orbit
assembly tasks; the size and breadth of the
integration required; the splintered delegation
of systems integration functions; and the
required coordination responsibilities among
NASA, its Prime contractor and International
Partners. ISS Program management, primarily
due to past annual funding constraints, has not
fully developed and implemented cost and
schedule risk mitigation plans to minimize or
eliminate larger schedule stretchouts or
increased costs.
Major Development Risk Elements
There are a significant number of cost and
schedule growth risks in a program of this
magnitude that have direct implications to the
total development cost of the Program and to
the schedule for completion of assembly. The
following list represents the major
development risk elements the Task Force
identified in the ISS program.
Hardware Qualification Testing The
Program has produced over 300,000
pounds of flight hardware and is
scheduled to double this amount by the
end of 1998; however, much of the
hardware and software production is
behind plan or still undergoing
development and qualification testing.
Additional cost growth potential resides in
the fact that various contractor staff will
remain on contract longer than planned, as
the Program completes qualification,
integration, and verification testing
activities.
On-Orbit Assembly Complexity
This phase of the ISS Program requires
simultaneous integration of launch
operations, on-orbit assembly operations,
engineering support, and logistics and
maintenance support with mission
operations over an extended period of
time. The full assembly sequence for ISS
will span a period in excess of five and
one-half years, involving over 93 flights of
multiple booster types to assemble and
check out, on orbit, hardware from around
the world. The overall complexity and
scope of this effort is beyond the current
experience base of NASA and the
International Partners and, as such,
contain cost and schedule uncertainties
and risks. The resource estimates, in terms
of schedule and budget, for this
undertaking are optimistic.
Crew Return Vehicle Development
The Crew Return Vehicle (CRV) is a new,
crewed, vehicle development program
which is required in early 2003 to support
the autonomous, safe return of up to seven
crew members. The CRV development
and deployment is on the ISS Assembly
Complete critical path. The X-38 is a
NASA in-house program to develop some
technology for the CRV vehicle. The X-
38 Program is 10 months behind schedule.
Currently, there is no integrated plan or
acquisition strategy that would provide a
seamless transition from the current X-38
Program to support CRV development and
production requirements and schedule.
Further, NASA's CRV budget and
schedule allow only $5 million of
expenditures in FY 1999, a production
award in FY 2000, and only three and
one-half years to operational need. In the
CAV Task Force's opinion, current CRV
Program plans will not support operational
readiness requirements to meet the
assembly sequence need date.
Multi-Element Integrated Testing
Multi-Element Integrated Testing (MEIT)
is a rigorous integration and testing
program intended to successfully
demonstrate systems interface
compatibility and end-to-end hardware
and software functionality. Major flight
hardware is scheduled to undergo MElT
just prior to launch; however, hardware
and software production activities have
very little remaining schedule reserve
between now and launch to address
unanticipated problems. Resolution of
problems or issues identified during MElT
will likely result in launch delays. The
highly integrated and interdependent
nature of the MEIT hardware and software
need dates and the phasing of MElT
activity also introduce a high potential for
multiple ISS launch schedule impacts.
Additionally, the schedule impact of
incorporating MEIT for the Phase I11
portion of the assembly sequence is not
yet reflected in the Program plan or
budget.
U.S. Laboratory Schedule
The Laboratory is currently several
months behind schedule, with a significant
amount of qualification and integrated
testing remaining to be performed.
Software development and testing are also
major concerns. Considering past trends
there is a high probability of additional
schedule erosion of several weeks or
more.
Training Readiness
Schedule slippage is affecting training
readiness. In addition to oral and written
language complexities, there are also
issues with respect to detailed approaches
to training that are cultural or
philosophical in nature and are yet to be
fully resolved.
Software Development and Integration
Software testing and integration are
traditionally the areas of space system
development subject to the greatest
schedule problems. The ISS has a
significantamountof softwarethathasto
beintegratedacrossmultipledomesticand
international suppliers. While many
software deliveries already have little
schedulemargin remaining, late flight
hardware deliveries will place further
pressureon softwareschedulesdue to
hardwareproblemslikely to bediscovered
during late stagesof testing. Typically,
latehardwareproblemsarecircumvented
by softwareworkarounds,thusincreasing
the time andeffort requiredfor software
integrationandtesting.
Parts and Spares Shortages
To contain near-term spending to within
the funding profile during peak
development, decisions were made to
reduce contracting for parts and spares
necessary to support the current schedule.
Various program activities were hardware-
limited during the development and test
phases. Not procuring adequate spares
during the initial production run of some
components may lead to quality and
consistency issues as well as increased
cost.
1.3. 2 International
Sixteen countries on four continents are
engaged in building hardware and software for
the ISS. Each country has its own
governmental limitations. Partner countries
have adjusted, and will continue to adjust,
their level of financial involvement and
schedule commitments, ultimately affecting
U.S. costs and schedules. Further,
modifications to the assembly sequence,
ground operations, and on-orbit operations all
require integration and various levels of
coordination and joint approval. The U.S.
developmental effort cannot be isolated from
these occurrences and their associated
impacts: the Program has experienced cost
growth and schedule slippage associated with
this broad level of international involvement.
This has been especially true in the case of
Russia. The anticipated one billion dollar cost
savings to the U.S. to be accrued from Russian
provision of the Functional Cargo Block (FGB
in its Russian language acronym) and an
Assured Crew Return Vehicle capability, was
a faulty assumption as far back as 1994. The
continuing economic situation in Russia has
also negated most of the $1.5 billion in
schedule savings to be achieved through their
involvement. Russian schedule slippage, due
largely to failure of the Russian government to
deliver promised funding, translates directly
to the most recent Service Module schedule
slips. With continuing funding shortfalls
carrying into 1998, the absence of any hard
indicators that adequate Russian funding will
be provided soon, and the recent cabinet
shake-up in Moscow, it is likely RSA
elements will experience further delays.
The CAV Task Force notes that a diminished
level of Russian participation could
significantly alter the current ISS assembly
sequence and final design. Proceeding
forward with full knowledge of the past,
present, and to some extent, the future
economic environment in Russia without
implementing adequate contingency
capabilities to address likely shortfalls is
tantamount to accepting a level of risk that
could drive U.S. costs significantly higher.
NASA contingency plans extending beyond
the development of the Interim Control
Module are not reflected in the current budget.
The Task Force believes the level of exposure
to increased cost from Russian delays justifies
the funding of additional contingency
activities.
Major International Risk Elements
The most significant cost and schedule growth
risks identified relative to International
Partner contributions are as follows:
Russian-Built Service Module
Inadequate funding will likely cause the
Service Module schedule to slip a
minimum of four months in addition to the
eight months already acknowledged and
incorporated into the Revision C baseline
assembly sequence. Service Module
subsystem deliveries are being affected,
andthis couldresultin a day-for-dayslip
until adequate funding is supplied.
Approximately$45 million dollarsin FY
1997Russianfundingarestill outstanding,
and there are no hard indicators that
adequateRussianfundingwill beprovided
anytimesoonfor FY 1998andbeyond.
Russian Logistics/Propulsion Support
Current RSA plans reflect a late 1999 Mir
deorbit. This plan, which calls for deorbit
a year later than NASA had desired,
foreshadows a Russian logistics impact to
the current ISS assembly sequence.
Russia's demonstrated Progress spacecraft
production capacity and its recent launch
rate capability do not support the view by
RSA that it can meet its collective ISS and
Mir requirements.
1.3.3 Operations
In the operations timeframe, the ISS Program
management believes it will be able to meet
its $1.3 billion annual operations funding
limit. The Task Force believes this level of
funding is inadequate to support the total
scope of the technical and operational
requirements.
Major Operations Risk Element
Maintenance and Obsolescence
The CAV Task Force anticipates that
upgrades due to normal wear and tear,
obsolescence, and degradation will be
required, and additional funding will be
necessary to support these needs. This
issue is addressed in section 4.3, but it is
not quantified. It is noted as an item of
significance and one that merits additional
in-depth consideration.
1.4 Conclusions
Given the above considerations, the Task
Force concludes that the Program has
inadequate funding to cover normal
developmental program growth, ISS cost and
schedule risks, and necessary risk mitigation
activities. The ISS will also likely experience
a delay of one to three years in the completion
of assembly.
Relative to budget formulation, the Program
will likely need the full level of funding
requested in the FY 1999 budget submission
to Congress. The Program should plan for
the development schedule to extend an
additional two years with additional funding
requirements of between $130 million and
$250 million annually, including the period
beyond Assembly Complete. The specific
annual CA V Task Force funding
recommendations are provided in Table 3-3.
This level of funding and schedule extension
results in a total assessed cost of
approximately $24.7 billion from the 1994
ISS redesign through ISS Assembly
Complete.
This level of funding should be sufficient to
address threats that are reasonably likely to
occur, with several noted exceptions: it does
not cover catastrophic launch vehicle or
payload failures, the withdrawal of an
International Partner, or the development of
a U.S. propulsion capability which the Task
Force believes should be factored into an
overall Russian contingency strategy.
1.5 Recommendations
1) The present program plan should be
revised so that it is achievable within the
financial resources available. Realistic major
milestone dates should be established as the
basis for development of the program plan and
internally defined target dates should be used
for execution. If necessary, program content
should be eliminated or deferred to fit within
funding constraints.
2) Develop and implement a comprehensive
cost and schedule risk evaluation and
mitigation strategy associated with the
delivery of Russian contributions, particularly
for the uncertainties associated with
propulsion and logistics capability and the
Service Module delivery.
3) DevelopandimplementPhaseIII MEIT to
mitigate on-orbit systems assembly and
integrationuncertainties.
4) ConsidermergingtheNASA X-38andthe
CRV developmentprograms,acceleratingthe
startof the CRV to FY 1999,andincreasing
the budget by $120 million. The CRV
scheduleurgencycoupledwith relativelyhigh
levelsof technicaland budgetaryuncertainty
supporttheneedto havea seamlesstransition
of experienceandlearningfromtheNASA
X-38Programto theCRVProgram.
5) Establish a specific organizationand
managementstructurewith responsibilityfor
SystemsEngineering& Integration (SE&I)
efforts,includingsustainingengineering.The
structureshouldincludebothgovernmentand
contractorpersonnelfrom all participantsand
should be given clear management
responsibility,authority and budgetto carry
out an integratedSE&I plan. NASA should
also clearly delineate and document the
systemsintegrationresponsibilitiesfor which
each party is accountableand currently
performing.
6) Establisha competitiveenvironmentfor
support contracts, such as sustaining
engineering, in order to reduce overall
programcosts.
7) Maintain the current level of research
funding. Developplansto maximizescience
utilizationon-orbitduringschedulestretchout.
8) Institute a systemfor determinationof
earnedvalueperformancemeasurementfor
the Non-Primescopeof effort. Non-Prime
activitiesaccountfor 65 percentof the total
staffing in 1998 and are growing as a
percentageof workperformed.Implementing
such a systemwould greatly increasethe
accuracyof statusreportingandof Non-Prime
costandscheduleprojections.
9) Verify theappropriatenessof aflat funding
profile for the operationstimeframeof the
ISS,specificallyassessinghowobsolescence-
induced upgrades will be planned and
implemented.
2.0 ISS Program Overview
The mission of the International Space Station
(ISS) Program is to build and operate a state-
of-the-art orbital research facility some two
hundred nautical miles above Earth. The ISS
Program stems from a redesign of the Space
Station Freedom Program in 1993 that
President Clinton had directed NASA to do to
lower its cost.
2.1 Freedom Redesign and ISS
Schedule and Cost Commitments
On March 10, 1993, NASA established a
Station Redesign Team to consider viable
space station options that would continue to
accommodate the International Partners
within specific funding constraints and first-
level goals established by the Clinton
Administration. The redesign team developed
three basic options, all of which required
funding in excess of target budget guidelines
and, in particular, above the $2.1 billion
annual cap that the Clinton Administration
proposed, and NASA accepted, at the
culmination of the redesign activity.
The President's Advisory Committee on the
Redesign of the Space Station judged two of
NASA's options to be roughly comparable and
satisfactory for meeting the Administration's
objectives, excepting those of cost, which all
options exceeded. That Committee, chaired
by Dr. Charles M. Vest, assessed NASA's cost
projections to be realistic, but recognized that
the space station should be considered as an
ongoing, evolving program of scientific and
technological research.
The Advisory Committee further
recommended that NASA and the
Administration pursue increased levels of
cooperation with Russia as a means of
enhancing the capability of the Station,
reducing costs, accelerating schedule,
providing alternative access to the Station, and
increasing research opportunities. It also
recommended that the Space Station Program
reorganize,reconfirming NASA's redesign
team'srecommendationto have one Prime
contractorresponsiblefor developmentand
integration.Thesefindingswerepublishedin
June1993.
TheStationconceptthatNASA selectedfrom
thisredesignactivitywascalledSpaceStation
Alpha. It wasa downsizedrepresentationof
SpaceStationFreedomwith thecapabilityfor
a crewof only four, andit wastotally reliant
on the Shuttlefor transportationand supply.
The original redesignoptionshad projected
PermanentHumanCapability(PHC) in 2001
or 2002. But thesescenariosalso required
peak annualfunding levels of at least$2.8
billion. In June 1993, the Administration
providedguidanceto keeptheProgramwithin
an annualexpenditurelevel of $2.1 billion.
NASA reassessedthe assemblyplans given
this constraintand revisedthe schedulefor
achieving PHC, deferring it to September
2003. Thecostfor SpaceStationAlpha was
assessedat$19.4billion.
In December1993,Russiawasinvitedtojoin
the partnership. It was thought that the
Russianparticipation in the ISS Program
would acceleratethe assemblytimetableand
avoid substantialdevelopmentcosts in the
areasof propulsionand navigation. It was
also estimated that Russian contributions
would nearly double the Station's on-orbit
volume,allowan increasein crewsizeto six,
andprovideanearlier crewpresence.After
Russia agreed to participate, geographic
constraintsof launchingelementsfrom the
Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan
necessitateda changeof launch inclination
from 28.5 degreesto one of 51.6 degrees.
While this changenegativelyimpactedthe
Shuttle'scargocarryingcapacityfor transport
of elementsandsuppliesto theStationby over
12,000 pounds per flight, the capability
reductionwas offset by the addition of 13
plannedRussianassemblyflights. Russian
participationalsoallowed completionof ISS
assemblyto be acceleratedfrom September
2003to June2002,aprojectedcostsavingsof
$1.5 billion. The Russianprovision of the
FunctionalCargoBlockandanAssuredCrew
ReturnVehiclewereestimatedto saveanother
$1.0 billion. Thesesavingswere partially
offsetby newU.S.costsidentifiedto integrate
Russia into the Program. In total, a net
estimatedcost savingsof $2 billion was
projectedfrom Russianinvolvement.Beyond
that, Russia'sinvolvementadvancedforeign
policy objectivessuch as demilitarization,
privatization,and integrationof Russiainto
theinternationalcommunity.
NASA statedat thetimethatit coulddevelop
the SpaceStation Alpha design within an
annual fiscal constraintof $2.1 billion per
year,andwith Russianparticipationit could
complete assemblyof what had become
knownastheInternationalSpaceStationfor a
total of $17.4 billion. Theseself-imposed
fundingconstraintswereestablishedprior to
the FY 1995 Congressional budget
submission. The Program was carrying
approximately$2.0 billion in reserveswith
approximately $500 million allocated
primarily for unresolved management
challenges. NASA's schedule and cost
commitments were definitely success-
oriented, especially considering the new
realignedcontractingapproachwith a single
Prime contractorand that the specifics of
Russia's involvement were just being
definitized.
2.2 ISS Development
2.2.1 1994 Events
There were many early challenges to NASA's
ability to maintain its cost and schedule
commitments. In the spring of 1994, Space
Station Freedom contracts had been novated,
but NASA had not reached agreement with
Boeing on a definitized Prime contract, and
Boeing was far from reaching contractual
agreement with the existing major
subcontractors. This did not occur until the
spring of 1996. NASA and RSA were still
working on an Inter-Governmental Agreement
(IGA) to bring Russia into the Program. It
was not until March 1994, when NASA was
ableto conducta full systemsdesignreview,
that the redesign activity was considered
complete. The initial baselineISS assembly
sequencewas not officially establisheduntil
November 28, 1994, reflecting FEL in
November 1997, with ISS Assembly
Completeby June2002.
By April 1994, Canada had shifted its
prioritiesawayfrom humanspaceflight and
spaceroboticstowardspacecommunications,
earth observation and technology
development. As a consequence,NASA
agreedto assumemore responsibility(and
more cost) for the extravehicularrobotics
function than had beenforeseenin NASA's
original agreementwith the CanadaSpace
Agency (CSA). As a result,Canada'sSpace
Station utilization rights during the
operational phase of the Program were
reducedaccordingly. NASA estimatesat the
time reflect that this reduction in CSA's
commitment increased NASA's overall
developmentcostsat completionbyover$200
million.
In June1994,theCentrifugeAccommodation
Module(CAM), whichwaspartof theSpace
StationFreedomdesignbut wasnot identified
specifically in the Space Station Alpha
assemblysequence,was broughtback into
ISS assemblyplans; however,additional
fundingfor this elementwasnot requestedor
provided.
It was agreedthat Russiawould build and
launchthefirst on-orbitelement,theFGB, in
the International Space Station assembly
sequence. To assureU.S. ownershipand
controlof theFGB,NASA decidedto procure
it through Boeing from the Russian
manufacturer, facilitating Russian
privatizationandsimultaneouslyallowingthe
first on-orbit elementto be a U.S. element.
This procurementcost the Programslightly
over$200million in reserves.It wasalsoin
this timeframe that a U.S.-developedCRV
wasaddedto the Program,yet no additional
funding was requestedby NASA. NASA
carriedthe CRV asa threatagainstreserves
until just recently,whenfundingwasallocated
in theFY 1999budgetsubmissionto Congress
specificallyfor theCRV.
Theonly notableU.S.developmentalproblem
occurredlate in 1994whenBoeing,thePrime
contractor, incurred welding and tooling
problemsin the developmentof the Node
StructuralTestArticle (STA). This resulted
in an approximatelyfour month impact to
horizontal drilling of the STA. Recovery
plans were put in place and the Program
appearedto be largely on track to meet its
commitments.
2.2.2 1995Events
At thestartof 1995,NASA hadincreasedits
reservepostureto slightly over $3 billion,
though there was still significant concern
aboutthe adequacyof near-termreservesto
carry forward into 1996. In increasingits
reserveposture,NASA had reassessedits
operationsand Non-Primebudgetestimates,
reducing its cost projections by over $2
billion. However, a fourth Photovoltaic
PowerModule,additionaltrussstructureand
other lesseradditionsto the Prime contract
hadincreasedtheamountof Primecontractor
work by approximatelythree quartersof a
billion dollars. NASA also realized that
certain managementchallenges for cost
reductionsthat it had carried in other areas
werenot going to be realized.Beyondthat,
newthreatsagainstheProgramhadincreased
significantly: NASA was now carrying the
CRV, a Control Module for contingency
against Service Module delays, additional
"make operable"changethreats,and other
threatstotaling$1.5billion.
In mid-1995, Revision A to the baseline
assemblysequencewasadopted.Therewere
nochangesto the schedulesfor FEL or final
assembly. The only significant changes
concernedthe addition of two new Russian
flights for poweraugmentation.
The earlier Node STA slippage rippled
throughthe boringand milling schedulesfor
the other U.S.-manufacturedpressurized
modules.Boeingalsobeganto showcostand
schedulevariancesin other areasas well.
Beyondtheunder-performancesituation,there
continued to be constantgrowth on the
contract from program changes totaling
approximately$340 million in 1995. This
growth,coupledwith theBoeingperformance
problems and an increasein cost of the
FunctionalCargoBlock (abovewhat NASA
originally projected)depletedNASA's near-
termdevelopmentreserves.In thefall of 1995
NASA re-phasedapproximately$350million
in ISSutilization funding to replenishnear-
term reservesconstrained by the annual
expenditurecap.
AssemblyComplete. These changes were
eventually reflected in Revision B of the
baseline assembly sequence, which was not
officially agreed to until the fall of 1996.
2.2.3 1996 Events
At the beginning of 1996, total ISS reserves
were still being held at close to $3 billion.
With the re-phasing of near-term funds from
the utilization account to the development
account, NASA believed it could maintain
1996 development schedules; however, near-
term reserves turned out to be inadequate to
address the many challenges that were to
occur.
As the development activity moved firmly
into the manufacturing stage, NASA was
beginning to review specific plans for
implementation of ISS integration and test
requirements. This review led to increased
testing and verification procedures that NASA
had to assess how to implement within already
strained resources.
RSA presented a proposal to NASA in
December 1995, for extension of the on-orbit
life of its Mir space station in order to use it as
a building platform for ISS. It also informed
NASA of a decision to not use the Russian
Zenit launch vehicle for assembly of the ISS.
NASA agreed to assist RSA by providing
additional Shuttle logistics flights and
continuing the Shuttle-Mir program into 1998,
but did not agree to use Mir as an on-orbit
platform for construction of the ISS.
Not using the Zenit would necessitate up to
four Progress launches for the Russian
Science Power Platform (SPP) assembly and
thus would cause considerable delay in its
operational readiness. NASA agreed to
launch the Russian SPP on the Shuttle to
mitigate assembly impacts. While Russian
Research Modules were affected to the
greatest extent, Node 2, the CAM, U.S.
Utilization flights, and the Japanese and
European Research Modules were all delayed,
with the CAM and European Columbus
Orbital Facility (COF) being delayed beyond
In the spring and summer of 1996, the Node
STA and the Node 1 were both undergoing
pressure testing. During these structural tests,
stress exceedances were identified in the
radial portals. NASA established a "blue
ribbon team" of senior structural and
aerospace program managers and engineers to
identify actions necessary to resolve the
problems. Additional strengthening struts
were eventually added to the Node structure,
and the problematic gussets were modified to
more evenly distribute stress across the Node
hatch. These "make operable" changes
resulted in additional Node delays and
contributed greatly to the Prime's cost and
schedule growth in 1996.
In addition to the structural Node problems, a
number of other development problems were
experienced in design, test, and
manufacturing. By the end of 1996, the
Prime's cost overrun was nearly $200 million
and growing at a rate of $16 million a month.
Also, other program changes for "make
operable" work continued to be required, with
approximately $200 million of funding being
used from reserves. Despite the difficulties, a
total of 155,000 pounds of U.S. flight
hardware had been completed by the end of
1996.
Good developmental progress was being made
by the International Partners, with the
continued exception of Russia. Throughout
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theyear,therecontinuedto beconcernsabout
the lack of progresson the ServiceModule.
While Russiacontinuedto maintain that it
could meet its April 1998, launch
commitmentfor theServiceModule,schedule
milestones continued to be missed and
deferred. NASA and the U.S. Government
appliedmanagementemphasisat all levelsin
an attempt to obtain releaseof adequate
Russiangovernmentfunding for RSA to
maintainits schedulecommitments.Finally,
in thefall of 1996,Russiaexplicitly informed
NASA that it wouldnot be ableto meet its
ServiceModuledeliverymilestone.
Throughout the year NASA had been
assessingvariouscontingencyoptionsshould
Russianotbeableto meetits ServiceModule
commitment. In Decemberof 1996,NASA
initiateddevelopmentactivitiesat the Naval
Research Laboratory (NRL) for the
developmentof an Interim Control Module
(ICM). The ICM would provide adequate
propellantandattitudecontrolto continueto
build the assembly sequenceshould the
RussianServiceModulebe further delayed.
The ICM would also be available to provide
some assurance against Russian logistics
shortfalls.
2.2.4 1997 Events
NASA entered 1997 with approximately $2.3
billion in reserves on the books through June
2002. Threats against those reserves,
however, had grown to $1.9 billion. As in the
two prior years, Prime contract cost growth
continued. Additional Program changes were
needed to make equipment operable, and
continuous cost increases were being driven
by Russian funding inadequacies and element
delivery delays. In addition, requirements for
maintaining an adequate workforce for
sustaining engineering and for procuring the
necessary on-orbit spares for maintenance and
contingencies were being delineated.
Definitization of these activities caused
additional cost growth.
Russia finally committed funding to continue
work for completion of the Service Module
and for other ISS commitments in the spring
of 1997. NASA and RSA worked together to
minimize schedule perturbations and to find
efficiencies and workarounds. In the final
analysis, an eight month slip was agreed to
and baselined into the ISS Program.
Russian plans to launch several Logistics
Transfer Vehicles (which were similar to the
FGB in design and were intended to minimize
the number of launches required for ISS re-
boost) were deleted and replaced with Russian
Progress vehicles with less fuel capacity. This
change introduced additional uncertainties
relative to Russian production capacity to
meet the higher flight rate required for
launches. Significant changes were made to
the assembly sequence, resulting in increased
training requirements. At the same time, the
Russian hardware delivery delays were
causing additional challenges to achieving the
planned training proficiencies utilizing actual
flight hardware and software.
In April 1997, NASA informed the Congress
of its plan to reallocate $200 million in new
FY 1997 funds from the Human Space Flight
Program to a new budget line item for
"Russian Program Assurance" (RPA). This
line item was established to fund contingency
activities addressing Russian uncertainties.
This line item, which Congress approved,
allowed the ICM to be funded and other
necessary changes to be made in order to
integrate the ICM into the ISS without further
depleting NASA's limited near-term reserves.
NASA originally suggested that this line item
be the source of funds to develop further
contingency alternatives to buy down the cost
and schedule risks that could result from other
Russian shortfalls, but no additional money
has been made available for that purpose.
In May 1997, all of the International Partners
met and agreed upon a new near-term
assembly sequence that accommodated
Russia's schedule slippage. They decided to
withhold a final decision on whether to
maintain the schedule showing the Russian
Service Module schedule at its projected
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launchdateof November1998or to insertthe
NASA-funded ICM into the assembly
sequence.The latter option would then
provideRussiaadditionaltimeto completethe
ServiceModule.No new datewasprovided
relative to AssemblyComplete,but NASA
indicatedthatit wouldslipbeyond2002.
The new assembly sequencereflected a
number of significant changes. The first
elementlaunch,beginningISSassembly,was
deferredfrom November1997to June1998.
A number of new flights were also
incorporated into th_ assemblysequence.
Two newlogisticsflightsprotectedtheoption
to integrate the ICM into the assembly
sequenceeither in place of the Service
Module or at a later date for a propellant-
related contingency. There was also a
significantamount of replanningrelativeto
logistics.Theeightmonthslipin theassembly
sequenceresultedin a utilization gapin the
researchcommunity's accessto space,so,
separatefrom theISSassemblysequence,two
new Shuttleutilization flights wereaddedto
the Shuttle manifest to maintain adequate
researchaccess.Approximately$25million in
ISS Program funding was applied toward
providing pressurized research laboratory
infrastructurefor theseShuttleflights.
In September,afterthe InternationalPartners
wereableto confirm that significantRussian
funding was, in fact, being appliedto the
Programandthat Russiansubcontractorshad
confirmed that the money provided would
allow the Service Module to hold its new
schedule,RevisionCto thebaselineassembly
sequencewasapproved.
RevisionC maintainedtheoptionto insertthe
ICM in 1999shouldRussiaincura shortfallin
its ability to providean adequatenumberof
Progresslaunch vehiclesfor ISS propellant
resupply and reboost. Revision C also
reflectedthe addition of: a third Node; the
reschedulingof the European COF back
within thetimeframefor AssemblyComplete;
and,integrationof two new logisticsvehicles
into the manifest,the EuropeanAutomated
TransferVehicle(ATV) andtheJapaneseH-II
Transfer Vehicle (HTV). The final launch
providedin theassemblysequencewasshown
in December2003.Specificsof NASA'soffset
agreementsi documentedin Section2.4.
ThethirdNodebeingprovidedasanoffsetby
ESA is a significant development. The
volumeof theNodeis roughlyequivalentto
theMulti-PurposeLogisticsModule(MPLM)
and,assuch,offerstheability to addmuchof
the crewhabitabilitysubsystemsthat wereto
be launchedon theHabitationModule. This
allows six-personPHC to be achievedwith
theon-orbitdeliveryof theCRV.
The Russian-drivenscheduledelaysoffered
NASA the opportunity to significantly
increasethe level of ground integrationand
verification testsplanned,thus reducingthe
threatof havingacostlyfunctionalintegration
problemoccur on orbit. When the launch
datesfor U.S.hardwarewereslipped,NASA
heldBoeingto mostof its contractualdelivery
dates. This providedsomeschedulemargin
betweenelementdelivery and launch into
whichNASA programmedMELT.Theseend-
to-endtestsaremeanto validatethattheearly
inter-elementalsystemswill workasdesigned.
Early in 1997,NASA took necessarystepsto
focusBoeingcorporatemanagementattention
on the ISS Programthroughthe awardand
incentivefeeprocess.Sincethen,Boeinghas
brought additionalfinancial and managerial
resourcesto theteam. Boeinghasdeveloped
a new baselinecost estimatethat reflectsa
total increaseof approximately$600million
over the life of the contract,with over $400
million of thatincreasealreadyincurred.The
PerformanceMeasurementSystemused to
track cost and schedulevarianceshasbeen
adjustedto reflect this new cost estimateat
completion.
The Programhasattemptedto limit changes
onlyto thosedeemedas"makeoperable"and
thosenecessaryto strengthenthe Program's
testandverificationprocesses.Thesetypesof
changesalonerequiredusageof $600million
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in Programreservesin 1997,shrinkingtotal
reservesthrough2002to approximately$600
million.
2.3Current Status
Entering 1998,the Programcontinuesto be
hamperedby someof thesameproblemsthat
it facedin precedingyears. Whilereasonable
progresscontinueson theU.S.elements,there
aremanychallengesaheadthat will resultin
increasedcost and scheduleerosion. U.S.
development problems continue to be
overshadowedby Russianfunding shortfalls
and delays in their commitments;however,
eventhe currentRevisionC scheduleis not
fully supportabledue to U.S. production
delaysandtheincorporationof muchneeded
multi-elementintegratedtesting. There is
relativelylittle uncertaintyassociatedwith the
launch datesof the first two U.S. element
flights. The U.S. laboratory,however, is
several months behind schedule and is
unlikely to recover, although workaround
plansare in placeto hold its scheduledMay
1999launch. Therecontinueto be recurring
problemssuch as late part and component
deliveries on downstreamflight elements,
similar to those that plaguedearlier flight
elements. While the Prime contractor
headcount is being reduced from the
development program, there has been
considerablegrowthin civil serviceandNon-
Primesupport.
While disconnectsbetween the level of
funding and work plannedon the Program
appearedin previousyears,theProgramwas
alwaysable to reflect an ISS funding level
within the $2.1 billion cap. The FY 1999
budget to Congress,submittedin February,
markedthefirst significantdeparturefrom the
$2.1 billion commitment, with NASA
requestinganadditional$430million for FY
1998.TheFY 1999submissionalsoreflected
$1.5 billion of additional funding in the
Programthrough2003. This included$626
million for thedevelopmentof a CRV. With
the levelof fundingrequestedin theFY 1999
submit, NASA believesit can absorbthe
currentServiceModuledelay,without asking
for additionalfunds.
Again, in 1998, it appearsthat the U.S.
developmentalschedule erosion will be
overshadowedby significantRussianfunding
andscheduleproblems. As of the writing of
this report,$45 million of RussianFY 1997
fundingearmarkedfor the ServiceModule is
still being delayed. Relative to FY 1998
funding,reportsarethat only a smallmonthly
allocationbasedon theRussianGovernment's
continuingresolutionis beingprovided,andit
has not filtered down to the contractors
performingwork. This situationhasresulted
in a minimumfour monthdelay in launchof
theServiceModule,with day-to-dayslippage
until adequateand sustained funding is
achieved.
At the GeneralDesignersReview(GDR) in
January,it wasclearlyevidentthat a lack of
adequatefundingwasgoingto further impact
the assessedfour monthdelay in the Service
Module launch. With the recent events
relative to the shake-upof the cabinet in
Russiaandthe continuedabsenceof any real
evidencethat funding is imminent,the CAV
Task Forcebelievesit is highly certain that
further scheduleslippage will occur. The
ServiceModule is near the point where it
couldbecompletedandlaunchedataminimal
cost.Unfortunately,continueddevelopmental
progressappearslinked with the availability
of governmentfunds which continueto be
problematic At this point, the lack of
sustainedfundingalsogivesrise to a greater
concern,thatof Russianlogisticssupport.
2.4 International Partner and Bilateral
Agreements
Under the Space Station IGA and Memoranda
of Understanding (MOU), each participating
agency is incentivized to spend its tax dollars
at home. The ideal outcome is to have no
transfer of funds among the nations. With the
international partnership, every country is
responsible for a pro rata share of the
operations cost necessary to sustain the basic
infrastructure and capabilities.
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To achievea full commonoperationscost
offset, ESA made using an ESA-developed
ATV to carry logisticsto the ISSa condition
of its continuedsupport. This agreementled
to the October1995confirmationof ESA's
commitment to a three-componentISS
contribution: the COF, the COFutilization
plan, and the ATV that will be launchedby
Ariane 5 and provide pressurized or
unpressurizedlogistics servicesand re-boost
for theISS.Similarly,Japanis developingthe
HTV with the goal of not owing NASA for
payloadlaunchservices,and thus, offsetting
itscommonoperationscosts.
As the U.S. agreedto launchthe European
COFmoduleand the Japanese pressurized and
unpressurized modules, each country desired
to determine what type of ISS contributions it
could make to offset the Shuttle launch cost
In exchange for Shuttle launch services for the
COF, NASA and ESA have reached an
agreement in principle on the provision of
Nodes 2 and 3 and utilization facilities. The
U.S. development plans called for the Node
STA, after testing, to be outfitted and flown as
Node 2. This obviated any opportunity to do
additional destructive testing on the STA that
appeared to be needed to resolve flight
certification concerns. The manufacturing
process that was used by Alenia to build the
MPLM for the U.S. results in a more durable
structure, while also providing a considerable
amount of additional on-orbit storage
capacity. The Node 3 is large enough to
accommodate most of the crew support
equipment planned for the U.S. Habitation
Module. Integration of this equipment into
Node 3 allows the U.S. to defer some
Habitation Module development activity to a
timeframe when there will be less strain on its
financial reserves. Having to provide support
subsystems for the new Node 3 as well as the
Habitation Module will result in an additional
cost to the Program of approximately $125
million dollars.
In exchange for Shuttle launch services for the
Japanese pressurized and unpressurized
experiment modules, Japan will build the
CAM, the Centrifuge Rotor, and a Life
Sciences Glovebox; launch a NASA payload
on a dedicated H-I].A flight; and build eight
payload interface units. Having Japan build
the Centrifuge equipment provides a
mechanism to fund equipment that would
otherwise impact other utilization capabilities
or be delayed.
NASA also entered into an implementing
arrangement with Brazil to provide some
utilization facilities and logistics carder
support. In return, Brazil would receive
access to certain NASA on-orbit utilization
resources, totaling less than 0.5 percent of
NASA's allocation, and the launch of 300
pounds of Brazilian payloads to orbit.
2.5 Overview of Current Baseline
The baseline for the Task Force's ISS
Program assessment is the FY 1999 budget
submission to Congress (Appendix F) and the
Revision C International Space Station
Assembly Sequence (Appendix G) and
schedule dated 9/30/97. The FY 1999 budget
submission to Congress recognizes several
problem areas experienced by the Program
during FY 1997 and early FY 1998 and
provides increased levels of new obligation
authority compared to the FY 1998 Budget.
Additionally, there is funding identified for
the development of a CRV commencing in FY
2000 (only $5 million in FY 1999).
The Revision C Assembly Sequence
commences with launch of the Functional
Cargo Block (FGB), scheduled for June 1998.
ISS Phase II is scheduled to be completed
after Flight 7A in August of 1999; ISS Phase
IN is scheduled to be completed after Flight
16A in December 2003. Approximately 93
flights, including assembly, crew transport,
logistics, and resupply are envisioned through
the completion of Phase HI.
At the time of this report, the Program Office
is establishing and reprogramming an
assembly sequence revision that will reflect
the completion of Development with the
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launchof Node 3 on Flight 17A. The ISS will
support six crew members at that time, given
the implementation of full crew return
capability through procurement of a second
Soyuz spacecraft or acceleration of the CRV.
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Figure 2-1 contrasts the FY 1998 and FY 1999
budgets. The major components of the FY
1999 budget submission to Congress are
shown in Figures 2-2 and Figure 2-3.
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3.0 Analysis and Assessments
The baseline program cost and schedule were
assessed in context of the risks described in
Sections 3.1 and 3.2. The programmatic issues
and the major risks were identified based on
the Task Force's exposure to the ISS program
over a four month perio d and represent the
collective experience and judgment of the
Task Force. Risks considered to be
"catastrophic" were specifically excluded,
e.g., withdrawal of an International Partner
contribution or protracted downtime due to a
failure of any of the principal launch vehicles.
Both the programmatic issues and the major
risk elements described below represent those
areas we feel are likely to adversely affect the
baseline cost and schedule. The magnitude of
these impacts is largely a matter of judgment.
The Task Force, however, is unanimous in its
opinion that program management has, to
date, been optimistic, particularly in planning
adequate schedule margin for critical events.
The Task Force's quantitative analysis in
Section 3.3 and the trend assessments in
Section 3.4 take a more pragmatic view of
current program status and the
interdependency of upcoming critical events.
The results of the two separate approaches in
Sections 3.3 and 3.4 are consistent and
together form the basis for the CAV Task
Force overall assessment.
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3.1 Programmatic Issues
The FY 1999 NASA budget submission to
Congress acknowledges that the ISS
development program will incur cost growth
over the original baseline commitment of
$17.4 billion. The baseline program reflects
NASA's commitment to the completion of
Phase III (Flight 16A) of the ISS assembly
sequence in December 2003. The Task Force
finds that there is a high probability that the
baseline program will incur additional cost
growth and has attempted to quantify those
cost growth issues considered to have the
highest probability of occurrence.
It is noted that the potential for cost growth
associated with the current phase of the
Program is likely to be driven by slippage in
the schedule. A significant part of the
remaining effort is directed at sequential
activities such as component qualification,
integration and test. These processes are
time-dependent. For example, a cost impact
will be realized when a failure occurs during a
qualification process. The failure requires
rework and then a repeat of the qualification
process. The sequential nature of the Program
results in subsequent efforts being delayed and
accomplished farther out in time. Thus, while
total Program cost will increase, annual
funding requirements are likely to be only
marginally impacted as depicted in the
funding profile of the current Program
assessment.
The following details identify cost and
schedule risks and provide the basis of
quantifying the anticipated contribution to
cost growth of the baseline program.
3.1.1 Russian Funding Commitment
There are significant benefits to be realized
from Russia's contributions to the ISS
Program as they provide critical propulsion,
resupply, crew exchange, and crew return
systems and capabilities. Because Russia is
undergoing a fundamental transition in its
economic, political, and social structures,
however, its participation continues to create
risks that can affect delivery of components
necessary to meet schedule and cost
commitments.
The new Russian constitution was not adopted
until 1993, and the budgetary process is still in
a period of transition. The government is
attempting to establish monetary controls to
cut non-budgeted expenditures and to make
critical analyses of resource requirements of
all government areas, including RSA.
Although there is a funding commitment for
the ISS at the highest government level, the
funding process is erratic, and it is difficult to
assess when the funds will actually be
supplied, not to mention the adequacy of those
funds.
For example, 1.8 trillion rubles ($300 million)
were allocated to the Program in FY 1997. Of
this amount, 1.5 trillion rubles ($250 million)
were special funding through the Ministry of
Economic Development. Much of this
money, funded through promissory notes, was
made available to maintain the Service
Module launch date. The process for obtaining
funds through floating promissory notes was
eliminated by decree in August 1997,
immediately prior to RSA's receiving its total
allotment. This left approximately 480 billion
rubles ($80 million) unpaid. Just this past
January, President Yeltsin directed the
government to provide the remainder of these
FY 1997 funds to RSA by February 15, 1998.
As of March 31, 1998, however, RSA had not
received the total balance of FY 1997 ISS
funds, and $45 million still remain
outstanding. According to RSA, another
$22.5 million is to be disbursed in April and
$22 million in May to complete the payment
of the FY 1997 funding.
As was the case in FY 1997, most of the
Russian funds for ISS in FY 1998 will come
in the form of supplemental funding. RSA's
budget provides approximately $100 million
in funding for ISS. As of the writing of this
report, the Russian Federal budget had
received approval of the lower house of the
Federal Assembly, but had not yet been acted
upon by the upper house. It is the Task
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Force'sunderstandingthat RSA is receiving
one-twelfthof FY 1997's national budget as
part of a continuing resolution. This is
allowing RSA to make some critical payments
to suppliers. The Ministry of Finance and
Ministry of Economics are to devise a plan for
supplemental funding on the order of $200
million by the end of April. Past experience
would suggest that it will come later in the
year.
The Task Force does not possess the in-depth
Russian economic forecasting expertise
necessary to accurately predict the outcome of
current monetary and economic policies of
RSA's long-term funding profile. Meetings in
Moscow with U.S. Embassy staff experts on
the Russian economy suggest that financial
challenges will continue for some time. At
this point, if all necessary financial resources
were supplied today, the Task Force believes
RSA would still not be able to meet the
Revision C launch schedule for the Service
Module.
3.1.2 Prime Contractor Performance
The Task Force estimates that the Prime
contractor will overrun the current baseline
development contract by at least $400 million.
This would bring the total overrun since
definitization on the Prime contract to one
billion dollars.
Beginning in mid-1995, the contractor
experienced cost overruns to the target plan.
These overruns began to increase significantly
during the fourth quarter of FY 1996. At that
time, the overrun stood at 4.4 percent of
budgeted work performed to date. For the
contract reporting period ending in the spring
of 1997, NASA provided zero award fee. As a
result, the Prime made some personnel
changes to strengthen its management team,
intensified its efforts to obtain and keep
technical staff, and committed over $30
million of Boeing capital to build a
systems/software integration facility.
As of October 3, 1997, the Prime contractor
had exceeded the contract budget baseline by
$398.2 million (8.9 percent of budget.) The
contractor was also behind schedule by $139.1
million of scheduled effort. Because of the
significant difference between planned
schedules and cost and that of actual
deliveries, NASA and Boeing agreed to
rebaseline the contract deliverables to reflect a
cost approximately $600 million above that of
the initial contract, with over $400 million of
that increase already incurred. The
Performance Measurement System used to
track cost and schedule variances has been
adjusted to reflect this new estimate of cost at
completion.
Still, cost and schedule variances continued to
grow during FY 1997. The realized overrun
was 19.6 percent of work performed during
the period and trending upward. The quarterly
increase during FY 1997 is noted in Figure
3-1.
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During the first quarter of FY 1998, the
contractor, per its agreement with NASA,
implemented a $600 million "'over target
baseline" adjustment to the total contract
baseline. In developing its own budget,
NASA internally assumed that the overrun
would reach $817 million, or $217 million
over the contractor estimate. NASA
subsequently increased its internal overrun
estimate to $849 million. The Task Force was
also advised of a $50 million overrun
absorbed by a major subcontractor.
Analysis of the effort remaining on the
contract indicates a high probability that cost
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overrun as a percentage of work content will
occur at increasing levels through completion
of the contract. Since the contract was
rebaselined, another $23 million in schedule
variance has already occurred. The de-
staffing plan is based on delivery schedules
that have little reserve margins, and the CAV
Task Force believes the Program has not
adequately accounted for the significant level
of qualification, integration, and verification
testing activities which will be incurred.
Historically, a high probability of rework or
redesign is required as a result of problems
routinely uncovered during testing.
Significant amounts of flight hardware
components have been produced but have not
yet completed qualification testing.
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Staffing levels continue to exceed past
projections. New projections for de-staffing
ignore past ex perience
Beyond that, the Task Force feels that
Program de-staffing plans have overestimated
the rate at which work will be completed and
staffing will be released from the program.
Figure 3-2 shows actual trends versus past
staffing projections.
Total program schedule slip also creates a
potential skills base risk. As flight hardware
and software is completed, the associated
skills base must be redirected elsewhere
within or released from the Program. This
could be occurring prior to qualification or
system integration. The criticality of the issue
will become manifest when testing identifies
the need for rework or redesign. This
situation is notably apparent at the lower-tier
subcontractors. This risk is common to space
programs, due to the unique nature of space-
related hardware and software. The ISS
Program Office has advised the Task Force of
its intent to address skills base retention
through the sustaining engineering workforce.
Given the funding constraints, however, this
workforce may not be adequate to completely
resolve the issue.
3.1.3 Non-Prime Performance (NASA)
NASA and other Non-Prime contractors are
directly involved in a significant portion of the
development, manufacture, integration, and
testing of ISS system hardware and software,
the development and implementation of
operations capabilities, and in the
development of research projects. Non-Prime
or NASA in-house expenditure is nearly
equivalent to that of the Prime contractor and
will exceed it in the outyears. In FY 1998,
Non-Prime effort accounts for $1.2 billion or
47 percent of the ISS budget. Within two
years, it will consume the majority of the ISS
budget.
This effort also includes a significant
component of civil service labor, which is
outside of the program budget. The Program
Office is limited to 400 civil servants, which
are considered full-time staff and are charged
directly to the Program. The FY 1999 budget
submission to Congress reflected a total
requirement for 2,157 civil servants for FY
1998, many of which are funded and matrixed
to the Program from the various NASA
centers (Figure 3-3). The total Non-Prime
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workforce(NASA andNASA contractors)is
over 7200 Full-Time Equivalents(FTE) in
1998. This is almostdoublethe numberof
FTEsemployedunderthePrimecontract.
I"Y 98 IKgCIVIL SERVICE
1nO0 7__
1000
800
60O
200
0
JSC KSC MSFC OTHER
I I I
Figure 3-3
NASA is unique among Government agencies
with respect to the degree of direct
involvement in its programs. It not only
manages commercial contractors, which is the
typical Government role, but it also performs
as a contractor. This is considered beneficial
in that it has allowed NASA to develop a
skilled pool of labor for functions that are of
limited demand and have very focused
requirements. It has certainly proved
beneficial to the ISS Program in that it has
given NASA a significant degree of flexibility
to absorb Prime contractor effort in an attempt
to reduce Program expenditures.
The Task Force notes that NASA does not
have an earned-value Performance
Management System (PMS) in place for much
of the NASA and Non-Prime contractor effort.
Because of the lack of a performance tracking
system, the Task Force encountered
considerable difficulty in evaluating NASA's
cost and schedule performance to date and in
forecasting its future. NASA and other
Government agencies require prime
contractors to maintain such a system to track
performance. Given the scope and content of
the NASA effort noted above, it would be
prudent to institute a system of performance
measurement for its own effort.
A Non-Prime PMS could have been useful in
identifying the impact of Prime contractor
effort absorbed by NASA. As noted above,
NASA has absorbed considerable Prime effort
in its attempt to mitigate the cost overrun. As
also noted, the Task Force considers this
flexibility, in the near-term, to be beneficial to
the Program. The Task Force is concerned,
however, that it could not identify the impact
on the NASA budgeted effort, present or
future. While the Non-Prime effort has
underrun relative to cost in previous years, the
Task Force could not determine if the NASA
effort had been eliminated, naturally
displaced, or deferred into the future due to
schedule slips. The Task Force believes that
work has been deferred and that this effort
will be added scope to the effort that has been
budgeted in the outyears. These efforts have
the potential for significant cost impact to the
Program which must be accommodated
through an increase to the annual funding
profile or additional schedule erosion.
The Task Force recommends that the Program
institute a system of performance
measurement, that would be applicable to
Non-Prime (NASA and contractor) efforts
including X-38 and CRV.
3.1.4 Contract Changes
The ISS Prime development contract has
experienced considerable change activity. At
the end of FY 1997, $1.4 billion in changes
had been authorized. Of this amount, $730
million was authorized, but not negotiated
with the contractor. The total amount of the
change activity represents a 27 percent
increase to the baseline budget estimate and is
31 percent of the budgeted effort completed to
date.
The Task Force concludes that the complex
nature of this program and the influence of
International Partners will continue to
contribute to change activity through
completion of the contract. The Task Force
estimates that the ISS Program will
experience a $425 million increase to the
development contract due to change activity.
It does not assume an experience rate at the
current level, but recognizes a significantly
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higher rate (20 percent) than the norm due to
the atypical nature of the Program.
3.1.5 System Integration and Sustaining
Engineering
The Prime contractor currently has contractual
responsibility for ISS integration. NASA's
intent has been to establish working groups or
teams of contractor and NASA personnel to
perform the integration functions. With the
beginning of hardware shipment to the
Kennedy Space Center (KSC), NASA
assumed responsibility for management and
technical portions of the system integration
effort by default in areas where the Prime
contractor was not technically prepared (in
NASA's view) to accomplish the scope of the
integration effort. While the contractor's
technical capability has improved, NASA is
still performing some of the systems
integration technical and management
functions.
There are also areas where NASA must act as
the systems integrator because the contractor
cannot represent the U.S. Government in
dealings with the International Partners. In
these cases, NASA and the Prime contractor
have implemented a matrixed approach, with
NASA performing top-level functions and the
Prime contractor performing much of the
necessary lower-level integration functions.
Similarly, NASA has assumed the
responsibility for the overall sustaining
engineering integration of the ISS. Each of
the International Partners and participants is
responsible for sustaining its specific on-orbit
and ground segments.
During the multi-year program transition
from hardware and software design and
development to systems integration and test,
launch, on-orbit assembly and operations, the
systems engineering and other development
engineering functions should also transition
over the same period of time to a support or
"sustaining" role on the Program. The Task
Force believes that the Program's approach to
sustaining engineering has several
shortcomings.
First, the budgeted level of effort for
sustaining engineering that NASA has
programmed is likely to be inadequate. The
Prime contractor estimated this effort to be on
the order of $1.4 billion while NASA had
originally budgeted $387 million. With the
FY 1999 budget submission to Congress,
NASA budgeted $952 million for Prime
contract and $150 million for Non-Prime
contract sustaining engineering. NASA and
the Prime contractor have agreed on the
content and tasks that need to be performed
over the life of the ISS but not the scope of the
tasks. A proposal for FY 1998 and FY 1999
only has been provided at this point for a
budgeted value of $143 million. The Task
Force believes that the sustaining engineering
effort has been underscoped in the current
budget submission and should be reassessed
for Prime and Non-Prime contractors, NASA,
International Partners, and other participants.
Secondly, the Task Force believes that the
Program's approach to sustaining engineering
could be improved by a focused management
approach to encompass the broader, technical
support activities of SE&I of which sustaining
engineering is a natural element. The current
NASA approach provides a level of
engineering support to Operations after the
development of all hardware and software
items are completed and accepted by NASA.
"Completion of development" is not a specific
time on the Program's schedule but rather is
spread over a number of years for the various
component assemblies of ISS. The Task
Force suggests that as the development
engineering function is incrementally
completed, the "sustaining" efforts required of
the developers become an integral part of a
continuing SE&I function and organization.
As critical skill additions to such an SE&I
organization, the sustaining engineering
personnel provide crucial life-cycle support as
hardware and software are assembled,
integrated, tested, launched and operated on-
orbit. After ISS Assembly Complete, the
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entire SE&I function (including the key
sustainingengineers)should have a total
Operationssupport focus; namely, mission
and vehicleperformanceanalysis,logistics,
ISShealthandstatus,hardwareand software
maintenance,andproblemresolution.
An excellentSE&I managementmodel for
ISS is the two, nearly simultaneousNASA
Viking Missions. NASA Langley Research
Center, the Jet PropulsionLaboratory,the
Prime contractor,the integrationcontractor,
theelementcontractors,andthescienceteams
wereintegratedinto a singleorganizationand
management structure. The ISS
implementationof a similar approachwould
naturallybelargerandmorecomplexbecause
of themultiplelaunchandon-orbiteventsand
the internationalparticipation. However,the
larger sizeand complexityof ISS is all the
morereasonthatsuchastructuredapproached
shouldbeconsidered.
The Task Force's overall assessmentof the
ISSsystemsintegrationeffort is thatit lacksa
management plan and clear leadership
approach. SE&I functions require focused
analysis and implementationin a tightly
controlled project environment. The lack
thereofgenerallyresultsin costlyhandoffsof
responsibility,rework and delays. Matrixed
or split management and leadership
responsibilities are risky and ill-advised.
NASA's view of its integrationresponsibility
for sustainingengineering,as statedearlier,is
whatNASA needsto implementin the larger
context of ISS SE&I. The Task Force
believesthatNASA mustprovidetheday-to-
daymanagementand leadershipof the more
comprehensive and broader SE&I
organizationthattheTaskForcehassuggested
in order to help control andmanagerisks in
the upcoming,critical integrationphasesof
theProgram.
3.1.6 Contingency Planning and Risk
Management
The ISS Program has a process which
addresses identification, assessment,
mitigation, and monitoring of identified
issues. It has established a reserve to fund
anomaly resolution activities that are
addressed through the risk management
process.
The Task Force believes these reserve levels
are inadequate for maintaining a reasonable
level of contingency protection.
The Task Force finds that budget and schedule
constraints have precluded ISS program
managers from adequately planning for
contingencies. Budget availability rather than
technical requirements has, in certain
circumstances, had a large influence on
program planning. As a result, contingency
planning, cost and schedule risk management,
and risk mitigation have tended to be less
proactive than they should have been.
Instances of this problem extend across the
program: the procurement of spares, the
resolution of continuing parts shortages,
implementation of MEIT throughout the
Program, the lack of adequate contingency
alternatives relative to Russian shortfalls, and
inadequate schedule and cost margins.
Program cost and schedule increases will
occur; however, the negative impact can be
reduced if the Program has the reserves to
develop necessary cost and schedule risk
mitigation plans and then commits itself to
implement these plans. This is an area in
which NASA, the Administration, and
Congress must have a clear understanding and
an agreed-to course of action.
3.2. Major Cost and Schedule Risk
Elements
3.2.1 Service Module
The Russians are continuing to make progress
on the Service Module despite funding
shortfalls and technical difficulties associated
with the construction of this important
element. The Service Module is three to four
months behind schedule in addition to the
previously-announced eight month schedule
slip due to both funding and technical
problems. Officially, RSA still maintains that
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it canmeetaDecember 1998, launch date, but
the Task Force's opinion is that a December
date will not be met, and an additional three to
four month slip is highly probable.
Subsequent to the January, 1998 GDR, RSA
signed an agreement with 13 of 14 critical
Service Module vendors promising to provide
outstanding funds by February 10, 1998. In
return, the firms agreed to ship to RSA
outstanding subcomponents that had been
withheld pending payment. Since then there
has been little forward movement relative to
financing. While most subsystems have been
delivered despite the lack of funding, there are
subsystems that continue to be withheld.
If the remaining 1997 supplemental funding,
decreed by President Yeltsin, is not received
soon, the Task Force is virtually certain that
further schedule slippage will occur. There is
a potential that the flight article could be
shipped directly from Khrunichev State
Research and Production Space Center
(KHSC) to Baikonur and undergo a lesser
level of testing. This is contingent on the
ability of the qualification unit in the Complex
Test Stand to successfully complete its
integrated tests. This alternative does reduce
some scheduled work, thus saving time, but
increases the risk due of problems being
uncovered on orbit. The next GDR is
scheduled for April, and the Task Force
anticipates that a revised launch date will be
established at that time.
Modifications have already been made to the
FGB so that if the Service Module incurs a
significant slip, NASA could launch the ICM,
dock it to the FGB, and continue assembling
the ISS. At this point in time, however,
NASA is de-integrating hardware from the
NASA-funded ICM that would allow it to
dock with the FGB. Necessary hardware to
dock the ICM to the Service Module will then
be installed on the ICM. This decision
reflects NASA's confidence that any further
slips in the Service Module will be relatively
insignificant with respect to the total Program
schedule. From this point forward, the most
likely ICM use would be as a contingency
alternative should the resupply capabilities of
the Russian Progress logistics flights fall short
of projections.
3.2.2 Russian Logistics and Propellant
Support
There are a number of concerns relative to
Russia's ability to maintain its logistics
commitments. Since Russia was invited to
join the ISS Program in 1995, it has changed
logistics carriers three times and has removed
one launch vehicle from consideration for ISS
assembly. RSA's inability to support Mir
logistics flights in 1997 and 1998
(necessitating use of the Shuttle) when it
desired to extend the Mir's on-orbit life is an
example of Russia's programmatic desires
being more ambitious than its funding or
launch vehicles could achieve.
RSA's Mir deorbit plan is inconsistent with
NASA's assessment of Russia's launch
capability to support ISS assembly. NASA
has urged RSA to begin deorbit operations for
the Mir now; they will take approximately a
year to complete. Current RSA plans reflect a
late 1999 deorbit. The current projected Soyuz
and Progress flight rate of 14 per year exceeds
their current avionics production capacity of
nine or 10 per year and their current launch
rate of approximately six per year. Regardless
of Mir deorbit, there are many concerns
regarding Russia's ability to support its
commitments: staff, facilities, and
commercial pressures. The threat to the U.S.
assembly is significant and demands
immediate additional contingency
implementation.
Further, Russian long-term funding
uncertainties and its financial incentive to sell
Station-reserved launch services on the
commercial market could impact logistics
planning. There are also concerns relative to
the inability to retain skilled personnel at the
Baikonur launch site due to a low wage scale.
Collectively, these factors suggest that it is
reasonable to expect perturbations in the
logistics schedule.
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At anyperiodin time,a one-yearISSon-orbit
fuel reserve is maintained. The only
contingencydevelopmentactivity NASA has
fundedis the ICM. It has a limited fuel
capacityand could only control and reboost
the stationfor an activeperiodof oneyear.
NASA believesit coulddevelopa newlong-
termreplacementpropulsioncapabilitywithin
a period of 24 months with adequate
supplemental funding. This Task Force
strongly supports developmentof a U.S.
propulsioncapability.
3.2.3Hardware Qualification Testing
Component and subsystem qualification tests
still lag significantly behind their scheduled
dates, but additional slippage on most items
has recently slowed. Nineteen major
subsystem hardware items successfully
completed qualification testing in the last
three months, bringing the total qualification
to 50 of 144 major items required through
Flight 9A. As of the writing of this report, four
qualification failures were open issues;
namely, the Integrated Motor Control
Assembly, the Early Port Communication
Transceiver, the external DC to DC Converter
Unit, and Vent Relief Valve.
Flight hardware component deliveries have
also experienced significant schedule slippage
but this situation also seems to have stabilized
somewhat. Several major problems have been
resolved recently in the S-Band and Ku-Band
communications hardware. ISS element-level
workarounds have become a way of life across
all facets of the Program due to hardware
shortages caused by lack of sufficient piece
parts and other development problems.
3.2.4 Software Development and
Integration
Because flight control and other types of
applications software cannot be fully tested
until the hardware to which it applies is
delivered, software testing and integration is
traditionally the area of space system
development that is subject to the greatest
schedule problems. The case of the ISS is no
exception to this general pattern since several
major pieces of hardware are apparently going
to be delivered past their original scheduled
dates. In addition to validating that the flight
software is correctly integrated with its
associated hardware, it is often the case that
hardware problems discovered during late-
stage testing very likely will have to be
circumvented by software workarounds, thus
increasing the time and effort required for
software integration and testing. It is often
more costly and inefficient to rework or
rebuild a piece of hardware to make it
conform to the original specification than to
alter the software specification so that
whatever hardware exists can be made to do
the job required. While software
modifications are often successful in
recovering the desired operational capability,
it does take additional time and cost to
incorporate the needed fixes, and that time
and cost is often labeled as a software
schedule slip and cost overrun.
As is noted by all participants in the Program,
including the Prime contractor and NASA
Headquarters' Independent Annual Review
team, maintenance of the schedule for
conducting the MEIT has been and remains a
major critical issue. The reason is that, for
MEIT to occur on schedule, all relevant
hardware and software must be completed and
available. In addition, integration problems
and schedule slips resulting from test
"failures" or other less dramatic pieces of
information uncovered during software and
hardware testing are normal even in simple
single contractor programs. The international
nature of the ISS Program and the consequent
need to merge software written in several
countries to operate hardware built in several
countries, intensifies the "normal" difficulties.
Software costs and delivery schedules have
historically been the most optimistically
underestimated portions of high technology
programs. The more complex the hardware
and programmatic interfaces are, however, the
more difficult the software problems are, and
the more likely and lengthy are the schedule
slips and resulting cost overruns.
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3.2.5 Crew Return Vehicle
The CRV, identified as a separate line item in
NASA's FY 1999 budget submission to
Congress, represents a new development
critical to achieving permanent human
presence on the International Space Station.
The only alternative to the CRV is the Russian
Soyuz vehicle, permanent dependence on
which would re-introduce and make pervasive
the significant production, operational and
logistics limitations that appear to be
characteristic of Russian participation in the
ISS Program to date.
The ongoing X-38 Project at NASA's Johnson
Space Center (JSC) is considered a technology
demonstration and proof of concept for the
CRV. Risk assessments and budgetary
estimates for the CRV have been extrapolated
by NASA from several years of X-38
experience. The first free flight of the X-38
occurred in March 1998. Five X-38 vehicles
are planned, divided into two separate
objectives as currently envisioned: a space
test segment (two vehicles) and a
comprehensive atmospheric segment (three
vehicles).
While the X-38 Project has nominally made
satisfactory technical progress, the program is
ten months behind the original schedule.
There remain significant technical and
schedule challenges for both the X-38 and the
CRV. The ISS Program also lacks a
definitive, integrated development, transition
and acquisition plan for the CRV. The major
programmatic risks involve: the schedule
mismatch between the X-38 space test
program and CRV production start; and the
fact that currently there is no plan for space
flight tests of a production CRV.
The lack of a transition and acquisition plan
represents an unnecessary critical issue that
should be addressed immediately. The CAV
Task Force believes that the schedule overlap
and critical dependencies between the X-38
and the CRV programs require serious
consideration be given to combining these
programs. The ISS program is considering
having significant international participation
in the CRV production program. The Task
Force believes that this participation will cost
the U.S. by introducing additional integration
and schedule risk. Additionally, the Task
Force recommends accelerating the CRV
program's start date to FY 1999 and
increasing its funding profile by
approximately 15 percent ($120 million)
through the Initial Operational Capability
0OC).
3.2.6 U.S. Laboratory (Lab)
The U.S. Lab is currently behind schedule; a
check of the Program's overall schedule as of
March 15, 1998 shows the Lab to be
approximately six weeks behind schedule.
Based upon current schedule trends, the Task
Force believes that a moderately conservative
estimate of the Lab's current status would
indicate a three to four month negative margin
at Lab completion.
The Program recognizes that the optimistic
schedule in place for the Lab will require
many complex and innovative workarounds in
order to incrementally recover from
anticipated late hardware and software
deliveries and other problems. The August
26, 1998, scheduled delivery to the KSC to
support MEIT objectives is in jeopardy due to:
• anticipated late delivery of equipment
racks and other Lab outfitting
equipment, which now will require
concurrent assembly and testing,
• continued delays in some hardware
deliveries including ORUs, GFE GPS,
BCDU, and ECLSS valve sets for the
pressure control panel and vent relief
valve, heat exchanger, etc.,
• continued late software deliveries and
problems on Payload Executive
Processor, Command & Control,
GN&C, Workstation Host and Video
Graphics, etc., and
• many retrofits and regression testing
required.
The U.S. Lab is an example of a major ISS
element that manifests many of the issues
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mentioned above in the Hardware
QualificationandSoftwareDevelopmentand
Integrationsections.TheTaskForcebelieves
theLabis a reflectionof pastissuesandmay
be an indicatorof possible similar future
occurrences.
02 and element leak tests are scheduled within
this period. Launch processing improvements
to the above time spans should not be
expected due to the large number of tasks that
have been transferred to the launch site in the
interest of schedule compression.
3.2.7 Multi-Element Integrated Testing
MEIT was proposed in 1994 as part of the
original Program baseline. It was later
eliminated from the negotiated contract to
achieve a funding profile that would satisfy
NASA funding constraints. In 1997, the
Program acknowledged an eight month
schedule delay necessitated by a slip in
completion of the Russian-built Service
Module. This provided an opportunity to
reintroduce MEIT into the Program baseline.
The Task Force strongly endorses the concept
of MEIT, but considers the schedule to be
optimistic. Phase II of the Program marks the
beginning of ISS assembly in space. MEIT
testing is intended to successfully demonstrate
element-to-element interface compatibility
and end-to-end functionality and operability of
flight hardware and software. Major flight
hardware is scheduled to undergo MEIT just
prior to launch. In some cases, notably Flight
5A (U.S. Lab), production schedules have
zero margin for meeting the launch schedule.
Further erosion of margin in flight hardware
deliveries would exacerbate the launch
schedule problem by extending the time
required for MEIT.
MEIT is also carried out in connection with
the Node emulator and Shuttle avionics, in
particular, the Cargo Integration Test
Equipment (CITE). The scheduled span of
time(s) from completion of MElT to launch of
the elements is also optimistic, because MEIT
will be performed in complex ground systems
test configuration(s) which are very different
configuration(s) from those required for
launch. A number of lengthy test disassembly
and launch assembly activities are planned
during the period of 12/3/98 to 4/1/99. Major
element tests such as EMC Qualification,
GN&C CSCI Acceptance and high pressure
At this point in time, there has been no
definitive planning for incorporation of MEIT
into the Phase III schedule. For all the vital
and valid reasons that the Program found it
advisable to incorporate MEIT into Phase II
of the Program, it is as necessary, if not more
so, to incorporate MEIT into Phase HI. Phase
117 of the ISS Program involves a larger
number of launches of many more
configurations of hardware and software from
the International Partners than does Phase II.
In addition, the many internationally-provided
pieces of equipment from different
development cultures will need to be
successfully time-phased into the launch
schedule and physically integrated into the
existing on-orbit configuration. The potential
for a major negative program impact due to a
mismatch between the scheduled delivery date
of a program element and its actual delivery
date increases dramatically during Phase III
because of the complexity and diversity of the
various elements in existence at that time. It
is at this point that the lack of rigorous and
unambiguous system integration responsibility
and authority, that the Task Force expressed
concern about earlier, becomes critical.
The hardware, software, ground test
equipment, ground test software, and
procedures required to implement MEIT for
ISS Phase 1II need to be developed as soon as
possible. A commitment to Phase 11I MEIT at
this time, not dependent on the essentially
random availability of the flight hardware
involved, is a prudent step to avoid risk.
3.2.8 On-Orbit Assembly Complexity
Assembly of the ISS will involve 35 assembly
flights over five and a half years, with
astronauts and cosmonauts performing three
times as much ExtraVehicular Activity (EVA)
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as all EVA combined since the Apollo
Program.
The experience gained from the Shuttle-Mir
program should be an indicator of the
additional complexity and challenge of
assembling a million pounds of ISS hardware
two hundred miles above Earth.
The coordination of 11 Russian assembly
flights, 23 U.S. flights, and four international
assembly flights synergistically supported by
48 logistics flights will be the most complex
and technically challenging achievement in
human space flight since landing on the moon.
EVA is planned to be limited to six hours per
day for assembly operations. The plan is that
one-third of the EVAs will be performed by
ISS crews. There are two contingency EVAs
for each Shuttle flight (one for ISS and one for
Shuttle). The program has additional
consumables to accommodate each of these
additional EVAs. Each Shuttle flight has
three planned EVAs with the exception of one
Shuttle flight, which has four. Interviews at
JSC stated that the budget for EVA over and
above that discussed above has little reserve
and minimal flexibility. Without even
addressing the functionality of thermal, power,
control, communications and other
considerations for the spacecraft to be safely
maintained, it is difficult for the Task Force to
accept that "most of the hard work is behind
us". Additionally, the complexity of different
ground control stations, multiple logistics
carriers, elements built in different countries,
space walk requirements as noted above, the
integration and coordination across different
cultures, add to and underscore the Task
Force's concern with the program's optimistic
date relating to Assembly Complete.
3.2.9 Parts and Spares Shortages
The ISS Program appears to have a solid
approach to the identification of sparing
requirements and to maintenance on-orbit. In
addition to the use of theoretical Mean Time
Between Failure (MTBF) rates, technical
directors have defined their sparing
requirements for worst-case scenarios,
including the need for everything from jumper
cables to replacement of failed Orbital
Replacement Units (ORU). This process has
defined much of the manifest for flights 2A
and 2A.1 to accommodate spares. The
identified sparing requirements have been
large. In fact, an external "porch" was built
on the outside of the Airlock to provide
necessary storage space for spares.
In regard to on-orbit sparing and
obsolescence, the ISS Program is attempting
to consolidate hardware from different
manufacturers in the NASA/Shuttle Logistics
Depot (NSLD) or the National Payload
Logistics Depot (NPLD) at KSC. There will
be a transition cost for moving commercial
and industry people to NSLD and NPLD to
train NASA personnel. But, once again,
paying this cost up front will mitigate the risk
of paying excessive cost for single
replacement units or, worse yet, not having
the units downstream. As good as this process
is, it also has a risk because some contractors
have proprietary processes and do not want to
participate in small quantity outyear
procurements. This will require NASA to buy
the companies' capital testing and/or
production equipment to produce critical
outyear spares in-house. The ISS Program is
planning to reengineer or redesign critical
parts (e.g., the Major Constituent Analyzer
and some computer system components) so
that, for example, the redesign of a circuit
board or integral part of a system can be
upgraded without changing the form, fit and
function of the replacement part.
Funding constraints and lagging development
have increased spares acquisition costs and
eroded delivery schedules. To contain near-
term spending to within the funding profile
during peak development, decisions were
made to reduce contracting for spares and
parts necessary to support the current schedule
for the ISS. Various program activities were
hardware-limited during the development and
test phases. Not procuring adequate spares
during the initial production run of some
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components introduces quality and
consistencyissuesaswellasincreasedcost.
Althoughthe normal industryapproachis to
produce spares late in production runs,
discontinuitieshave occurred when flight
production has slipped. When the spares
acquisitionorganizationhas to pick out a
production unit to garner for its spares
procurement,manufacturinghasto producean
additionalunit for a replacement.If sparesare
not produced during the production run,
additional costs are incurred, including the
retentionof critical engineeringskills. In at
least one instance, "EEE" parts (high
reliability parts) were bought in two
purchases. Sparesacquisitionmissed the
production run and paid the price for
discontinuityin the form of lot chargesand
highcostsfor singleacquisitions.
ORUsare currentlybeingproduced,but the
qualification programis lagging,holdingup
sparesacquisition. The Programhas also
experiencedthe opposite case: having to
restartproductionlines that were shut down
after flight unit deliverieswere completed
becauseadequatefundingwasnotavailableto
procuresparesatthetime.
To avoid issues such as this, it is critical that
the ISS logistics and manufacturing functions
jointly plan and coordinate spares
requirements, insuring that delivered spares,
production diversion, and backfill are always
in proper balance.
3.2.10 Training
At the time of the writing of this report, there
were instances where prototype training
hardware was not yet available for training on
key components of the various systems.
Delivery delays of both hardware and software
are having a direct impact on training
preparation. Late hardware delivery and
checkout often results in operational
workarounds that must then be factored into
training procedures. Delays in operational
software delivery, integration, and testing are
further impacting training, because astronauts
interface with the ISS largely through the eyes
and ears of the command and control, data
analysis, and mission support software. Late
deliveries can result in training personnel
being outside the loop relative to late design
changes in hardware and software. Existing
training manuals and those currently being
written are apparently based on the original
design specifications, not on the as-built
system that will likely depart from the original
design in several noticeable areas.
It is imperative that early flights have
integrated training procedures reflecting
current hardware and software design
configurations. Flight procedures must be
adequately developed and tested using
simulated conditions with the flight crews.
Furthermore, Russian and American training
procedures have developed separately over the
past 40 years and differ significantly in many
respects. Classroom vs. hands-on, extensive
written training manuals vs. simple lists of
directions, and independent initiative on-orbit
vs. dependence on decisions made on the
ground are but a few differences of approach.
When the CAV Task Force reviewed the
training program, there was no agreement to
merge the training approaches into one unified
program.
The Program has provided its assurance that
these crews will be fully trained on all critical
systems prior to flight. The CAV Task Force
is not taking issue with flight safety, only that
significant cost and schedule risk exist in this
area.
3.3 Quantitative Analysis
The space experience of both NASA and the
Air Force support the view that significant
schedule slips associated with only one or two
of the cost and schedule risk elements
investigated by the Task Force can, by
themselves, force major delays in the overall
ISS completion schedule, even if all other
possible risks considered do not materialize.
Software integration and test are often one of
those critical issues that can delay a program
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far beyond expectations, even after all
hardware is built and ready for operations. In
the ISS case, the Russian-built Service
Module could have much the same effect -- its
unavailability at a critical point in the
schedule would force an extended delay in all
scheduled flights associated with human
presence on the ISS. It follows from this
analysis that it is not necessary that all
possible cost and schedule risk scenarios
come to pass for the Program to experience
significant schedule slippage and cost growth.
All that is required is that one or two
strategically scheduled risk elements
materialize.
provide estimates of required funding levels
that are tied directly to the major sources of
risk. The cost to Assembly Complete has
been calculated on the basis of covering
specific risks at specific levels of confidence.
Statistical treatment of the dollar cost of
overcoming the identified risks is necessary
because of the high degree of uncertainty
inherent at this time in how virtually all the
risk issues identified are to be resolved, from
Russia's ability to complete the Service
Module in a reasonable amount of time to the
Prime contractor's ability to test and integrate
all the software from the various International
Partners.
Analyses by the Task Force, along with
schedules produced by the Blackhawk
Management Corporation (especially the most
recent such schedule, dated February 17,
1998), indicate rather convincingly that
virtually all initially allocated schedule
margins associated with the events that the
CAV Task Force has deemed critical have
essentially been used up. While several
program-identified risks, some of which have
been closed and others of which remain at
least partially open, have been covered by the
initial schedule margins, significant risks that
may have already adversely impacted the
Program schedule are left without any margin
of coverage.
Each significant risk will induce, with some
degree of confidence, a probable schedule slip
and an additional cost. The exact length of
the schedule slip and the exact amount of
additional cost are, of course, unknown at this
time, but the most optimistic and most
pessimistic scenarios in each case have been
estimated by the Task Force. In each case, the
eventual value of schedule slip or cost growth
to be experienced is represented in our
analysis by a number selected statistically
from the interval between the most optimistic
and most pessimistic values.
Estimation of probable cost magnitudes (along
with their associated confidence levels) by
statistical analysis allows the Task Force to
3.3.1 Schedule Impact Assessment
Consideration of feasible ways to resolve the
major risk issues (i.e., the risk issues that have
the potential to significantly impact ISS
Program schedule and cost) leads directly to
quantification of probable Program schedule
and cost. Uncertainties in how much time and
money will eventually be needed to resolve
the issues can be bounded below by Program
management's optimistic ("best-case")
forecasts and above by the Task Force's
understanding of the "worst-case"
contingencies likely to affect the Program.
Statistically, however, an "average" case (i.e.,
neither the "best" nor the "worst" case) will
actually occur, so a statistical picture of ISS
cost and schedule to Assembly Complete can
be derived by modeling and simulation of
risk-issue resolution options.
As an example, consider the logic of the Task
Force's quantitative assessment of the
probable schedule impact of the critical issues
associated with the Russian-contributed
Service Module. (See Section 3.2.1 above for
the technical and programmatic details.) The
optimistic (best-case) scenario envisions a
four month schedule slip in delivery of the
service module due to (1) current delays in
Russian government funding provided to
RSA, (2) current delays in delivery of
subcontracted parts and components to
Energia, and (3) the need to test and qualify
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parts and systems after delivery and
integration.
Thepessimistic (worst-case) scenario assumes
a Russian failure to meet its commitment to
deliver the Service Module and envisions a
24-month slip in the ISS schedule as the U.S.
NRL prepares the ICM as a replacement.
Intermediate schedule slips (the "average"
cases referred to in Section 3.3 above) lasting
between four and 24 months, with the longer
slips increasingly less likely, can be attributed
to (1) a longer-than-anticipated delay (e.g., 8
to 12 months) in Russian funding provided to
RSA, or (2) need for rework uncovered during
qualification testing of Service Module parts
and the integrated unit.
A similar analysis has been carried out for
each of the other risk issues identified as
possibly exerting a significant impact on ISS
Program schedule and cost. The specific risk
elements considered by the CAV Task Force
and their estimated optimistic and pessimistic
schedule impacts are listed in Table 3-1
below.
The Root of the Sum of the Squares (RSS) of
the optimistic (best-case) and the pessimistic
(worst-case) slippages in Table 3-1 are
statistical indicators of the probable minimum
and maximum schedule slip in the total ISS
program. The RSS takes account of the fact
that there will be schedule slips attributable to
some, but not all, of the risk elements
identified. The RSS of the pessimistic
slippages is approximately 38 months, a
possible slip of a little more than 3 years
beyond the currently scheduled Assembly
Complete date of December 2003.
ESTIMATES OF SCHEDULE SLIPPAGE
ASSOCIATED WITH MAJOR RISK ELEMENTS
POST-REV. C SLIP (MONTHS TO ASSEMBLY COMPLETION)
RISK MOST MOST
ELEMENTS OPTIMISTIC PESSIMISTIC
Russian Service Module
Russian Logistics Support
Flight H/W Delivery (Qual)
MEIT II (Cumulative)
Software Integration
Training (Cumulative)
Crew Return Vehicle
MEIT III (Cumulative)
U.S. Laboratory
Assembly Complexity
ROOT-SUM-SQUARE (RSS)
4 24
3 9
3 12
2 6
2 6
2 6
6 18
3 6
2 6
3 12
10 38
Notes: ( 1) Months of slippage suggested are reduced if some of the slippage occurs while a prior item is slipping, i.e. beneficial effects
on certain critical issue issues of slipping of prior events is taken into account For example, if the Service Module slips,
then it is possible, at least in the optimistic ease, that slippage of Training, Software Integration. and Crew Return Vehicle
will not exert any add/.t/onal negative impact on the overall ISS schedule. Slippage in Qualification Testing and MELT,
however, will probably not be covered by any slippage in the Service Module, since these items a_o/v to the Service Module.
(2) The parenthetical note "Cumulative" attached to some critical issues means slippage due to that issue occurs over the entire
ISS schedule, not simply the initial incident. This applies to Training and ME/T, which must be undertaken throughout the
entire ISS schedule.
Table 3-1
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3.3.2Cost Impact Assessment
The various possible scenarios leading to
schedule slippage have also been analyzed
with respect to their impact on cost growth. In
estimating ISS cost to Assembly Complete,
cost growth is anticipated to arise from three
distinct sources: (1) costs incurred throughout
the program network by the need to maintain a
"standing army" or other constant monthly
expenditure flows while awaiting delivery of
one or more critical components; (2) costs
incurred by the U.S. due to failure of Russia to
deliver the developed, integrated, and fully
tested Service Module within 24 months of its
scheduled delivery date and/or to provide
required launch or logistics capability at any
stage of the Program; and (3) costs incurred in
completing specific risk-element work
packages (listed in Table 3-1) for which the
U.S. has assumed primary responsibility.
The transition to cost growth from schedule
slip in situation (1) above has been made
using the so-called "burn rate" (or rate of
expenditure of funds) by those aspects of the
Program that are either actively or passively
impacted by stretchout of their schedules. In
case (2), where the risk is that the Russian
Service Module will not be available on
schedule, no additional U.S. expenditures will
be required unless the Russians fail to deliver
the module within 24 months. If they do fail
to provide it within 24 months, U.S.
expenditures will be needed to complete and
deliver one or two ICMs as replacement
vehicles.
ESTIMATES OF COST GROWTH
ASSOCIATED WITH MAJOR RISK ELEMENTS
POST-REV. C COST (BILLIONS OF DOLLARS TO COMPLETE)
RISK MOST MOST
ELEMENTS OPTIMISTIC PESSIMISTIC
Total Schedule Slippage* 1.800
Russian Service Module** 0.000
Russian Logistics Support** 0.000
Flight H/W Delivery (Qual) 0.075
MElT II (Cumulative) 0.010
Software Integration 0.075
Training (Cumulative) 0.010
Crew Return Vehicle 0.120
MEIT HI (Cumulative) 0.040
U.S. Laboratory 0.050
Assembly Complexity 0.015
ROOT-SUM-SQUARE (RSS)*** 0.174
4.900
0.400
0.000
0.450
0.080
0.375
0.060
0.680
0.230
0.250
0.075
0.968
* As indicated earlier, these dollar figures are costs incurred throughout the program network by the need to maintain "standing army"
or other constant monthly expenditure flows while awaiting delivery of one or more critical components. They are not related to any
one or more risk issues and are not included in the statistical analysis described below.
** As mentioned above, even if the Russian Service Module does not become available on schedule, there will be no additional U.S.
expenditures required unless the Russians fail to deliver the module within 24 months. If they do fail to provide it within 24 months,
U.S. expenditures in the amount of $400 million viii be required to complete and deliver one or two ICMs as replacement vehicles, if
the Russians later prove unable to provide the required numbers of Soyuz and Progress vehicles (regardless of whether or not the
Service Module has been delivered) needed to carry out ISS logistics needs over the Program's life cycle, additional U.S. expenditures
can he anticipated. Launch costs, including those of the several Shuttle launches required to orbit U.S. and foreign components, are
beyond the scope of this study.
*** Not including the dollar values associated with total schedule slippage, Service Module risk, or Russian logistics risk.
Table 3-2
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If the Russiansprove unable to provide the
required number of Soyuz and Progress
vehicles to carry out ISS logistics needs over
the Program's life cycle, additional U.S.
expenditures can be anticipated, of which The
CAV Task Force has left all discussion out
that out of our computations. Finally, case (3)
consists of those cost growth estimates
attributable to the resolution of specific major
risk issues that are listed in Table 3-2 on the
previous page.
As in the case of schedule slippage, the RSS
of the optimistic (best-case) and the
pessimistic (worst-case) cost growth values
(not including those due to total schedule
slippage, the Service Module, and Russian
logistics) are statistical indicators of the
probable cost growth in the total ISS program,
based on the estimated cost-growth levels in
Table 3-2. The RSS takes account of the fact
that there will be cost growth of various
magnitudes attributable to some, but not all, of
the risk issues identified. The RSS of the
optimistic growth levels is $175 million, while
the RSS of the pessimistic growth levels is
$968 million, calculated with respect to the
FY 1999 budget request of $20.3 billion. A
Monte Carlo statistical analysis of the total
cost growth indicates that the 50/50 probable
cost growth due to the last eight risk elements
in Table 3-2 is $980 million, required through
Assembly Complete. While the probability is
50 percent that the cost growth estimate of
$980 million will be exceeded, the probability
is only 30 percent that the 70th percentile
cost-growth estimate (according to the Monte
Carlo simulation) of $1.08 billion will be
exceeded. If a confidence of 90 percent is
desired for establishing a budget for Assembly
Complete, the appropriate cost growth to
prepare for is $1.24 billion.
It is important to remember that the numbers
in the previous paragraph cover only the last
eight risk elements in Table 3-2. To those
numbers must be added an amount to cover
the eventual total program schedule slip.
Optimistic and pessimistic bounds for that are
listed at the top of Table 3-2. If we consider
the 50/50 probable cost growth due to
schedule slip, which is $3.3 billion, and add
that to the 50/50 probable cost growth to the
eight major risk elements, which is
approximately $1.0 billion, we obtain a total
cost-growth estimate of $4.3 billion over and
above the FY 1999 budget request of $20.3
billion. Based on the statistical analysis we
have conducted, then, our estimate of the
50/50 probable ISS total cost is $24.6 billion.
It is important to remember, though, that this
number does not include funding for possible
extreme contingencies such as complete
Russian failure to deliver the Service Module
(which could add an additional $0.4 billion to
U.S. expenditures) or Russian failure to
provide the launch and logistics capability for
which they are responsible. U.S. expenditures
to cover the latter contingency are considered
outside the scope of this task and therefore
have not been estimated by the Task Force.
3.4 Trend Analyses
In addition to the quantitative approach
described above, a separate assessment was
developed based on the trend of program
milestone schedules over the past four years
and subjective judgment for future program
execution. These results were consistent with
the quantitative results in Section 3.3, and the
two approaches formed the basis of the Task
Force's overall assessment.
3.4.1 Schedule
Dates for the principal ISS milestones, FEL,
Phase II Completion, and Assembly
Complete, have been revised several times
since the baseline schedule was established in
September, 1994. The earlier schedule
adjustments were to be expected, given the
evolving nature of both the Space Station
definition and the International Partner
involvement. However, we believe the current
Revision C assembly schedule continues to be
overly optimistic and does not reflect the
complexity of the remaining effort nor the
reality of schedule threats identified to date
and addressed in the previous section.
31
Figure3-4showstrendsin thedatesfor major
ISS milestones since the baseline was
establishedin September1994. During the
three year period from the Baseline to
RevisionC, theAssemblyCompletedatehas
been delayed 18 months, and the total
timespanto achieveAssembly Complete has
increased by 18 percent.
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In order, to project likely completion dates
based only on experience to date, the various
revisions to milestone dates were replotted as
a function of time-to-go to the milestone. This
is shown in the following Figure 3-5. For
completeness, the 6 Crew Capable milestone,
Flight 17A, is also included as part of the Task
Force assessment.
•, Ass mbly Complete
/ First Element "_'. III
60._ [ Launch _k.. _ ""
| / 6 Crew Capable _?.. \ %,
/ I_ _e Right 18A.1_,_ _.
40 Phase II " , \%
Months to Milestone Estimate _
I i t\',t I I I\l\l
"CY CY -CY CY CY CY CY CY CY CY
-97 -98 -99 ..00 -01 -02 -03 -04 -05 -06
Figure 3-5
The assessment of schedule impact reflects
the Task Force's collective judgment of
current and anticipated threats and confirms
the trend of schedule changes experienced to
date. As shown in Figure 3-5, the Task
Force's projection for the most likely Phase II
completion is mid- to late-calendar year 2000,
6 Crew capability in late-calendar year 2004,
and the full Assembly Complete expectation is
not earlier than late-calendar year 2005.
3.4.2 Budget Impact
The schedule stretchout described above will
impact the baseline budget. The principal
components will be increased costs for both
Development-related items and Operations-
related items, specifically sustaining
engineering and logistics and maintenance.
As assembly of the ISS progresses, the
distinction between Development and
Operations becomes increasingly blurred. For
assessment purposes, the Task Force
combined the baseline Development and
Operations budget lines and estimated a 15
percent increase through the remainder of the
Assembly Complete period. This represents a
reasonable target for off-loading personnel
while maintaining critical skills and necessary
resources during the full assembly period; i.e.,
until at least mid-calendar year 2005.
The Program Office plan for transition from
Development to Operations funding at Flight
17A does not impact the Task Force's bottom
line assessment of funding required to
assemble and operate the ISS. The Task Force
feels that a level funding profile, commencing
in the FY 2004 timeframe, is appropriate for
the life of the ISS, but recommends a
validation of this approach by the Program.
This validation should recognition the
continuing development activities during the
life of ISS. The fiscal year funding impact is
shown below.
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No adjustment is recommended for the
Research budget line, even in light of the
projected schedule stretchout. The Research
funding line appears reasonable, containing
adequate reserves, and the Task Force feels
there will be opportunities for significant
research during the protracted assembly
period.
The impact of a schedule stretchout as shown
above will essentially deplete the currently
identified unencumbered reserves. Figure 3-7
shows the current (FY 1999 budget)
unencumbered reserve and the net reserve, by
fiscal year, after accommodating the higher
budget profile resulting from a schedule
stretchout. The CAV Task Force believes this
to be an unacceptable reserve level given the
risk areas identified and the need to maintain
prudent reserves for other unknown threats.
The Task Force recommendation is also
shown in Figure 3-8 and represents an overall
level of 13 percent unencumbered reserves.
The Task Force did not attempt to assess the
impact of a schedule stretchout on the
Program Operating Plan for FY 1998. At the
time of the Task Force assessment, the
Program was carrying a negative
unencumbered reserve of $48 million. This
included $200 million in required FY 1998
funding allocated since the Program Operating
Plan 1998 Guideline, as well as some $285
million in additional threats then under
review. Additional funding to offset the $200
million had been identified within the overall
NASA budget and was the subject of ongoing
Congressional negotiations. The Task Force's
assessment, given the near-term threats
identified at this time, is that the Program
needs full funding in FY 1998 to the level
provided in the FY 1999 budget submission to
Congress to ensure successful Program
execution during FY 1998.
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The majority of the threats and risk areas
identified in previous sections will pose
continuing challenges for ISS Program
management. The Task Force is confident
however, given the level of unencumbered
reserve identified above and additional margin
for the CRV, that the management team will
be able to successfully execute the program.
3.5 Summary Assessments and
Recommendation .
In summary, the CAV Task Force
recommends a revised budget profile that:
• provides adequate funding in FY 1998, as
outlined in the FY 1999 Budget submit,
• accommodates a two year schedule
stretchout to achieve Assembly Complete,
• provides an appropriate level of
unencumbered reserves to address major
risk areas through Assembly Complete,
• accelerates CRV development and provides
additional funding protection
commensurate with the maturity of X-38
technology demonstration and transition,
• provides an appropriate level funding
profile for the life of the ISS (Table 3-3
contains the Task Force' s
recommendation), and
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,, the Task Force believes that the major
threat to the long-term viability of the ISS
is the uncertainty associated with the
Russian funding commitment and the
potential impact on the basic station
infrastructure and utilization capability.
The Task Force strongly recommends an
immediate investment in developing
permanent U.S. propulsion and logistics
capability.
Fiscal
Year
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
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FY 99
Submit
($mil.)
2.270
2.134
1.933
1.766
1.546
1,466
!.466
cAv I
Recommendation I
($ millions) I
2,499
2,324
2.103
1,896
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1,584
1,584
i
Cumulative
Funding
(Smillioms)
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4.0 Other Observations
4.1 Full Cost Accounting and Civil
Servants
The Federal Financial Improvement Act
(1996) requires Government agencies to
aggregate all costs associated with programs
including civil servant salaries, travel costs,
and infrastructure support. NASA plans to
implement this requirement with its FY 2000
budget submission to Congress. To date, the
costs associated with civil servants and
infrastructure, e.g., facility costs, operation
and maintenance of facilities including
telephone, computer and utility costs, were
accounted for separately. These costs will be
included in the total cost of the ISS Program
and increase the ISS budget significantly. It is
important to understand that these are not
increased costs, but have simply been
accounted for in the budget separately in the
past.
The total cost estimates in this report do not
include these changes required under full cost
accounting. It is estimated, however, that the
number of civil service FTE working on ISS
in 2000 will be 2,197 at an approximate cost
of $176 million. This includes the cost for
individuals who fulfill the contractual
commitment claimed by the Prime.
The Task Force is concerned that workforce
downsizing will likely result in a shortage of
personnel, particularly those with the skills
required for the work to be performed.
4.2 Shuttle Program Support
The Shuttle budget has been and will continue
to be treated as a separate program under full
cost accounting. With more than 35 Shuttle
flights required to deliver ISS hardware to
orbit, however, it could arguably be included
as a Space Station cost, significantly
increasing the total cost shown, while not
being an additional cost to the NASA budget.
These observations are not meant to set off
alarms but are made to acknowledge that full
cost accounting will cause sokrne budget lines
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increase significantly, while other budget lines
will decrease.
The Task Force does have a concern that, as
the decisions regarding schedule changes are
delayed and announced at the last minute, the
Shuttle must be able to react in a cost-
effective manner. Close coordination with the
Shuttle Program must be maintained and as
much advance notice as possible given in
order to allow for economically effective
adjustments to the Shuttle schedule.
4.3 Maintenance and Obsolescence
This phase of the ISS Program requires
simultaneous integration of launch operations,
on-orbit assembly operations, engineering
support, and logistics and maintenance
support with mission operations over an
extended period of time. These activities are
beyond the current collective experience of
the ISS team and, as such, contain cost and
schedule uncertainties and risks. The Task
Force also anticipates that upgrades due to
normal wear and tear, obsolescence, and
degradation will be required, and a
considerable amount of additional funding
will be necessary to support these needs.
Giving the ISS Program credit for their current
sophisticated spares program and their
creative planning for future requirements, the
Task Force's opinion is that there is no way to
control spares currency, or lack of currency,
for all International Partners, or the normal
rate of obsolescence in space systems and
computer technology which will cause major
cost growth in outer years. This is not a
pejorative opinion; it is one based on the
reality of the current speed of technological
advancement. It is extremely difficult to
estimate the cost growth associated with this
issue, but it will be major.
4.4 Launch Vehicle and Payload Failures
The Task Force did not assess the schedule or
cost impact(s) that would be realized if the
Program experiences one or more failures of a
major payload element or segment while it is
on-orbit or failures of the various launch
vehicles with their attached payloads. It
clearly needs to be recognized and understood
that there is a high likelihood that one or more
failures, including catastrophic failures, will
occur over the span of 93 launches. The
reliability of the better launch vehicles in the
world is approximately 92 percent. This
reliability figure would indicate that over the
large number of launches of the Russian and
U.S. launch vehicles and upper stages, the
program will need to provide additional
schedule and funding to recover from such
eventualities.
5.0 Summary
The ISS Program at this stage has resolved
many of the major programmatic open issues
and is engaged in the very intense process of
completing the development of the required
hardware and software systems. The
completion of the development and
qualification of the hardware and software
products continues to require additional time
and effort beyond what was estimated and
planned. This situation should be expected
for development programs with high cost and
schedule risk, particularly one as large and
complex as ISS. Program management,
however, continues to predict that the
hardware and software developments will
meet planned performance goals in the areas
of schedule and cost, despite the fact that
similar predictions in the past have not been
realized by the Program. Late deliveries of
development hardware and software have
prevented the timely completion of
qualification units and are forcing delays in
the development of mission operations
products and procedures. For example, the
effectiveness of crew training procedures has
been adversely impacted by delays in
availability of basic hardware and software
units. These delays have moved crew
training, ideally a quiet background activity
ongoing throughout the entire life cycle of the
Program, onto the critical path of the schedule
for Flight 5A (U.S. Lab) mission preparations.
Program management's "success-oriented"
planning approach has necessitated a large
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amountof parallelandworkaroundactivities,
resultingin additionalcostandschedulerisks
to theoverallProgram.In addition,fiscalyear
fundinglimitationsand mandatedde-staffing
haverequiredthat otherplannedwork efforts
be deferred. The combinedeffectof these
considerationshasbeento createunrealistic
scheduleand cost-to-completeexpectations
for the developmentProgram as well as
lengtheningthe list of critical issues.Several
examples that have recently surfaced to
illustratethe negativeimpactof this situation
include the following: flight components
being manufacturedbefore their respective
developmentand qualificationprogramsare
successfullycompleted; element systems-
level environmentaltestingnot beingpartof
the Program baseline;crew training being
planned using non-flight hardware and
softwaresystemsrather than trainingon the
versionsthat will ultimately be used; and
crewsscheduledfor flights during the early
assemblyphasenothavingseenor trainedon
thehardwareandsoftwarethatwasstill being
developedwhentheywerelaunched.Another
specific example is the U.S. Lab, whose
software and hardware are plannedto be
incrementallyupdatedby serially adding a
numberof systemsoveranextendedperiodof
time. Currently the Lab and its racks of
electronicsareseveralmonthsbehindin their
delivery, integration and test milestones.
Becauseof thesecircumstances,theU.S.Lab
has becomea scheduleand cost issue of
significantcriticality that likely will require
additional,unplannedredesign,rework,retest,
redelivery,reintegrationandretraining.
OverallISSsystemsintegration,test, launch,
and flight operationsneedto be reassessed
with respect to the scheduleand cost to
complete. While the Task Forcerecognizes
that element system-level environmental
testingis not now andhasneverbeenpartof
the ISS Program baseline (basedupon
NASA's experience in several earlier
programs),this policy is not widelyaccepted
in the aerospaceindustry. It is undeniable,
though, that ISS developmentcosts and
scheduleshave beenimprovedby omitting
systemlevel tests. This advantage,however,
comes only at some level of increased
technical,schedule,andcostrisk. Thecurrent
ISS plan calls for 45 assemblymissions
withinapproximatelyfive years, including33
Shuttle flights and 12 flights on Russian
boosters. While it shouldbe expectedthat,
during the launchand on-orbitoperationsof
this largeamountof equipment,the Program
canexperiencesomenumberof launchand/or
vacuum-relatedenvironmentalproblemswith
someof theequipment,this likelihoodis not
taken into account by the Program's
contingency operational planning and
equipment-sparingplans.
Unlike previousShuttleflight experiencein
which each Shuttle flight is essentially
independentof the precedingand following
flights, payload operationsfor each ISS
assemblyflight aredefinitely linked to those
precedingit. This linkage requiresanother
dimensionof systemsintegration that has
never been required previously -- namely,
integrationbetweenflights. There are also
numerous(about 48) Soyuz and Progress
logisticsandresupplyflights thatarerequired
during this period, in addition to the ISS
assemblyflights.Theseperiodiclogisticsand
resupply mission schedulesand hardware
availabilityarethereforealsouniquelylinked
to theflight-to-flight integrationandassembly
complexity.
Nearlyall of the 23 Shuttleassemblyflights
will requirea largeamountof EVA by the
crewsin orderto assembletheISShardware.
Flight supportequipmentalone for the ISS
EVAstotalssome4000items,exclusiveof the
hundreds of other items that are to be
assembled.Thecrewtrainingrequiredfor this
numberof configurationend items will be
much more extensive than the collective
experienceof the U.S. and the International
Partners. Additionally, the difficulty of
training is further complicated by the
necessityof having bilingual training in
EnglishandRussian.
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It is likely, andshouldbe expected,that the
manyinterrelatedProgram eventsassociated
with the assembly,integration,test, launch,
on-orbit assembly, resupply and mission
operationsof the many individual systems
elements will experience a number of
unexpectedproblemsand surprises.Current
Program schedules,however,includingthose
encompassingthe near-termeventsthrough
ISSPhaseII, lackadequateschedulereserves
to accommodate more than a few
unanticipatedproblems,andnoneof anylong-
termconsequence.Theseverityof theimpact
of suchoccurrenceswill grow assuccessive
developmentandqualificationdifficultieslead
to requiredparallelwork andcompoundlate
deliveries.Forexample,lackof adequateand
timely sparesfor thegroundandon-orbittest
operationscould causeseriousscheduleand
costs impact to the highly integratedISS
masterschedule.
Thecritical issuesthattheISSProgramfaces
in its developmentphaseappearto be in
conflict with the budgetplan calling for a
significantoff-loadof developmentpersonnel
overthenext 24months. TheProgram plan
andschedulesneedto recognizeandaccount
for a more realistic assessmentof Program
performanceand the work content and
scheduleto completethe Program. Off-
loading personnelto match an externally-
imposed Program budget profile that
inherentlyassumesthat all therequiredwork
is beingaccomplishedon timeonly aggravates
and perpetuatesunrealistic projections of
actualperformance.In reality,aggressivede-
staffingto meetfundingtargetsmerelydefers
work that will, at somepoint, requireeven
longer retention of existing personnelor,
perhaps,evenadditionalhiring to guarantee
availability of critical skills. Currently,
significant amounts of work have been
deferreddueto good-faithattemptsto comply
with the externally-imposed de-staffing
schedule.Critical issueshave been pushed
downstream, thereby exerting additional
pressureon future schedulemilestones. For
effectiveprogramexecution,realisticschedule
and funding profiles that incorporate
contingencyplanningalternativesneedto be
developedandmaintained.
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6.0 Appendices
Appendix A_ NASA .Administrator Letter Requesting Independent ISS Analysis
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Office of the Administrator
Washington, DC 20546-000
September 17, 1997
Dr. Bradford Parkinson
Chair
NASA Advisory Council
Washington, DC 20546
Dear Dr. Parkinson:
I continue to value and encourage the NASA Advisory Council's independent analysis, observations, and
advice on NASA's management and operations. A key factor in NASA's ability to gain increased bipartisan
and public support for our programs has been the Agency's commitment to cost control. Given the near-
term budget challenges that we have before us, it is imperative that we maintain this commitment and
identify process improvements for the fiscal management of our programs. I request that you and the
Council assist us and provide an increased emphasis on costs.
As a first example, I would like the Council to establish a cost control task force within its Advisory
Committee on the International Space Station (ISS). This has urgency because of recent problems
associated with cost control of the ISS. This task force would be directed to conduct a prompt,
independent, and thorough analysis of the management, operational, and programmatic factors that affect
cost growth and control of these research and development activities.
I would appreciate receiving the final recommendations of the Council coming from this analysis by the
end of March 1998. I would be glad to discuss this matter with you further. It is my hope that the issues
identified as a result of this review will be applicable to and lead to subsequent analyses by task forces on
other major programs.
Sincerely,
Daniel S. Goldin
Administrator
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Appendix B: Terms Of Reference
COST ASSESSMENT AND VALIDATION TASK FORCE
TERMS OF REFERENCE
October 14, 1997
These Terms of Reference establish the Cost Assessment and Validation (CAV) Task Force of the
Advisory Committee on the International Space Station (ACISS), a standing committee of the NASA
Advisory Council (NAC). The CAV Task Force is chartered to perform an independent review and
assessment of costs, budgets, and partnership performance on the International Space Station (ISS)
program and to provide advice and recommendations to the NAC on the same. To accomplish this, the
committee will hold in-depth reviews of all budgeting and estimating techniques being employed for
managing costs on the ISS program, including rationale for costing assumptions, management of reserves,
forward pricing techniques and acquisition procedures. The CAV Task Force will also review the
contractual performance of all participants in the ISS program.
The objective of this activity will be to provide advice and recommendations for the following:
• Cost effective modifications to the present business structure and cost-management practices;
• Determining total ISS cost over the program life.
The Chair of the CAV Task Force is appointed by the Deputy Administrator. Membership will be
comprised of senior persons who are nationally recognized experts with extensive experience in the
disciplines of contracting, procurement, estimating, costs analysis, and technical and business
management of high technology and space-based programs for both Government and industry. The
Task Force will consist of six members. Term of membership is for the duration of the Task Force.
Members will be appointed as Special Government Employees.
MEETINGS
The Task Force will meet three times in formal session. It will meet seven times in organizational or
fact finding sessions.
REPORTING
The Task Force will report its findings and recommendations to the ACISS and to the NAC.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS
The Executive Secretary will be appointed by the Associate Administrator for Space Flight and will
serve as the Designated Federal Official.
Travel funds for Task Force members will be provided by the NAC budget from the allocation to the
ACISS. Any other expenses associated with the Task Force will be funded by the Office of Space
Flight.
The Office of Space Flight will provide staff support for the Task Force.
DURATION
The Task Force will terminate in 6 months from the date of these Terms of Reference or when its
report has been submitted to the Administrator.
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Appendix C: Letter Requesting CAV Response to Congressional Requirements
Mr. Jay Chabrow
President
JMR Associates Inc.
8841 Cortile Drive
Las Vegas, NV 89134-6142
November 6, 1997
Dear Mr. Chabrow:
Thank you for accepting the Chairmanship of the Cost Assessment and Validation (CAV) Task
Force. The Task Force assessment of the International Space Station (ISS) costs is vital to the future
of the ISS and the Nation's civil space program. This is a demanding exercise to accomplish by
March 1998. NASA is fortunate to have a man with your background and capabilities to head this
crucial activity.
The Terms of Reference for the Task Force are enclosed. As you know, they have been approved by
General Dailey and establish the scope of activity for the Task Force. The CAV Task Force is
chartered to perform an independent review and assessment of costs, budgets, and parmership
performance on the ISS program and to provide advice and recommendations to the NASA Advisory
Council on the same. The CAV Task Force will also review the contractual performance of all
participants in the ISS program. The objective of this activity is to provide advice and
recommendations for cost effective modifications to the present business structure and cost-
management practices of the Space Station program, and to determine total cost over the program
life.
In addition, the ISS program has been given requirements by the Appropriations Committees of both
the House and the Senate to accomplish by March 1998 in order to secure release of the remaining
$851,300,000 of this year's funding. The language in the Appropriations Conference Report reads
"...$851,300,000 remains fenced until and unless NASA provides the following items to the
Committees on Appropriations of the House and Senate, and the Committees subsequently approve
the release of these funds:
° A detailed plan, agreed jointly to by NASA and the prime contractor, for the
contractor's monthly staffing levels through completion of development, and
evidence that the contractor has held to the agreed-upon destaffing plan through
the first four months of fiscal year 1998;
2. A detailed schedule, agreed jointly to by NASA and the prime contractor, for
delivery of hardware, and NASA's plans for launching the hardware;
° A detailed report on the status of negotiations between NASA and the prime
contractor for changes to the contract for sustaining engineering and spares,
with the expectation that NASA adhere to the self-imposed annual cap of
$1,300,000,000 for operations after construction is complete; and
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4. A detailedanalysisby aqualifiedindependentthirdpartyof thecostand
scheduleprojectionsrequiredin 1),2), and3)above,eitherverifyingNASA's
dataor explainingreasonsfor lackof verification.Givenhowseverethe
program'sbudgetproblemsare,theconfereesarealsomindful thatfuture
NASA budgetsmustbefundedwithindiscretionaryspendingcapsin thefive-
yearbalancedbudgetagreement,meaningthatbudgetoutlaysinFY 1999for
all discretionaryspendingwill growbyjustonepercent.As aresult,the
confereesareconcernedthatfutureNASAbudgetsnotforcereductionsin the
currentout-yearprojectionsfor spacescience,earthscience,aeronautics,and
advancedspacetransportationbecauseof theneedto accommodateoverrunsin
thespacestationbudget."
We arelookingto accomplishnumberfouraboveby theCAV TaskForcereview. Throughthe
courseof youractivity,pleaseensurethatthiscongressionalrequirementis met. Manythanks,Jay,
for takingon thischallenge.
Sincerely,
:,._ici'_ard.!. Wisnie'_',_ki
Wilbur C. Trafton
Associate Administrator
for Space Flight
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Appendix D: CAV Task Force Letter Assessment in Response to Congressional Requirements
Dr. Bradford Parkinson
Chair
NASA Advisory Council
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, DC 20546
March 25, 1998
Dear Dr. Parkinson:
The Cost Assessment and Validation (CAV) Task Force has conducted a careful analysis
of the International Space Station technical challenges and its cost and schedule projections. The
CAV findings are based on the FY99 Budget Submit to Congress, Revision C of the ISS Assembly
Sequence and other material provided to the CAV over the total _'eview period. The CAV has only
recently received a draft copy of NASA's "White Paper" dated March 20, 1998, which is intended to
respond to specific items called out in the NASA appropriations language contained in House Report
105-297. Assuming the NASA final response is consistent with program plans provided earlier to
the CAV, the general comments provided below are applicable. The material presented in the final
NASA response will be further reviewed and included in the CAV final report.
In the three areas of concern noted by Congress and addressed in the NASA response we provide the
following general comments:
. A detailed plan, jointly agreed by NASA and the prime contractor, for the
contractor's monthly staff'mg levels through completion of development, and
evidence that the contractor has held to the agreed upon de-staffing plan through
the first four months of FY 1998.
NASA and Boeing have agreed to a de-staffing plan which is consistent with
the FY 1999 budget submit to Congress and with Revision C of the ISS Assembly
Sequence. The agreed upon de-staffing goal reflects a reduction in Design,
Development, Test and Evaluation (DDT&E) contractor staff from approximately 6,000
FTEs in October 1997, to approximately 3,600 FI'Es by September 1998. The de-
staffing plan is consistent with the "over the target" baseline cost goal that NASA and
Boeing agreed to in October 1997. The "'over the target" baseline was generated in
anticipation of the Prime contract overrun of $600 million (Boeing estimate).
The FY 1998 de-staffing plan for the prime contractor and prime subcontractors assumes
an off-load of approximately 120 Full Time Equivalent (FTE) people from the prime
contractor to NASA civil servants. The number of 120 FrE's was a working estimate
provided to the CAV prior to completion of NASA/Boeing negotiations for FY 1998.
The CAV has not seen the actual number of F'I'E's to be off-loaded in FY 1999 and
beyond. Through the first four months of FY 1998 the prime contractor has under run
the revised de-staffing goals.
Although the prime contractor's staffing levels have generally tracked to the new plan,
schedule slippage and work deferrals continue to occur and development schedules
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remainaggressive.A highpotentialrisk for contractorstaffto remainoncontractwill
continuethroughqualification,integration,andverificationtesting. In theCAV's
opinionprogramde-staffinggoalsdonotadequatelyaccountfor:
a) developmentworkyettobeaccomplished;
b) mitigationof currentandpotentialrisks;and,
c) retentionof theappropriateskill mix throughcompletionof development.
TheCAV analyzedtheISSde-staffingplansfor severalprioryearsandfoundtheywere
alsonotachievedfor theabovenotedreasons,inadditionto annualfundinglimitations
imposedon theprogram.Thecurrentdevelopmentde-staffingplanfor theprime
contractorandits subcontractorsequiresoff-loadsatagreateratethanall previous
plans. TheCAV believesattemptingto adheretothesede-staffingplansis unrealistic
andwill introduceadditionalriskandcoststhatcouldotherwisebeavoided.
2. A detailed schedule agreed jointly to by NASA and the prime contractor for
delivery of hardware and NASA's plans for launching the hardware:
The CAV has evaluated the Revision C assembly schedules between Boeing and NASA
for delivering hardware. These Revision C schedules form the NASA FY1999 budget
submit and are part of the total data the CAV Task Force reviewed and assessed.
The CAV believes NASA' s schedule is optimistic. While the Program has achieved a
considerable amount of progress to date, delivering over 260,000 pounds of flight
hardware through December 1997, much of this hardware is still undergoing
development and qualification testing. Challenges that will arise in the process of
performing hardware and software integration and integrated test activities, compounded
by late qualification test results, indicate to the CAV that significant schedule risk
remains. The CAV expects that additional schedule slippage and costs will be incurred
beyond that which the Program is currently reflecting. Therefore, it is suggested that
additional reserves be identified and expended to mitigate these risks.
. A detailed report on the status of negotiations between NASA and the prime
contractor for changes to the contract for sustaining engineering and spares with
the expectation that NASA adhere to the self-imposed annual cap of $1,300,000,000
for operations after construction is complete.
NASA and Boeing have reached agreement on both sustaining engineering and sparing
levels for the early part of the program. Firm agreements are in place for 1998 and 1999
and negotiations are currently in work for the follow-on years.
NASA and Boeing have negotiated a level of effort contract for FY98 and FY99 that
reflects budgetary requirements that appear inadequate to support the total scope of the
technical requirements. The CAV Task Force is concerned that a more significant effort
will be required for ISS because of the complex need to simultaneously integrate launch
operations, on-orbit assembly operations, engineering support, and logistics and
maintenance support with missions operations over an extended period of time. The
increased complexity is inherent in the assembly and operational nature of the ISS.
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Relativeto sparing,theCAVbelievesthatfundingconstraintshaveforcedareductionin
contractingfor necessaryspares/parts.Thisminimumsparinglevelcouldcausequality
andconsistencyproblemsif latersparesarenotincludedin thesamedevelopment
productionruns. Additionally,theremaybeaproblemwithavailabilityof keyparts
neededto supportheaggressiveon-orbitassemblyschedule.
While theProgrambelievesit will beableto achievethe$1.3 billion annualoperations
projection,it is highlyunlikelythattotalISSannualexpenditurescanbecontained
within thisamount.TheCAVanticipatesthatupgradesdueto normalwearandtear,
obsolescence,anddegradationwill berequiredandaconsiderablelevelof additional
fundingfor replacementswill benecessary.
In considerationof theabovefindings,theCAV TaskForcebelievestheprogramwill requirean
additionalevelof annualfundingbetweeneightto tenpercentof theprogram'sannualbudget
forecast.TheCAV TaskForcefurtherbelievesthattheISSwill likely experienceschedulegrowth
of oneto threeyears.
Sincerely,
JayChabrow
Chair,CostAssessmentand
ValidationTeam
cc:DanielS.Goldin
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Appendix E: Biographies of Members
Mr. Jay W. Chabrow, Chair is President of
JMR Associates, Incorporated, consulting to
technology-based companies. He is an expert
with over 35 years experience in contracts,
pricing, cost estimation, analysis, and
procurement for aerospace projects.
Previously, Mr. Chabrow was directly
responsible for all contracts, pricing and cost
data systems for TRW's Space and Defense
Sector. In 1993 Mr. Chabrow was appointed
by the White House to the President's
Advisory Committee on the Redesign of the
International Space Station and he has served
on numerous advisory committees for NASA,
DoD and the intelligence community. He was
a consultant to the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Installations and Logistics (I&L)
and was a member of ASPR-DAR/FAR
pricing subcommittees. He was one of twelve
national members selected to generate the
Contractor Risk Assesment Guide (CRAG),
providing estimating criteria for government
and industry. Mr. Chabrow was a member of
the Aerospace Industries Association's
Procurement and Finance Executive
Committee and currently is a member of the
National Contract Management Association
(NCMA) and is on NASA's Advisory
Committee on the International Space Station.
Rear Admiral Thomas Betterton retired
from active duty in January, 1992 after serving
35 years as a Naval Officer. During his
career, over 16 years were devoted to the
definition, development, deployment, and
operation of major space-based sensing
systems. Since his retirement, Rear Admiral
Betterton, has been retained as a management
and technical consultant by a number of
aerospace related corporations. He has a wide
variety of experience in material acquisition
and life cycle support of naval weapons
systems. Currently, he is a member of the
U.S. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board and
is a Fellow of the AIAA.
Dr. Stephen A. Book is Distinguished
Engineer at The Aerospace Corporation, El
Segundo, CA, serving as the Corporation's
principal technical authority on costs of space
and space-related systems. He was appointed
to his current position in December 1995.
From 1989 to 1995, Dr. Book held the
position of Director, Resource and
Requirements Analysis Department, leading
the Corporation's efforts in cost research,
estimating, and analysis. In prior positions at
The Aerospace Corporation, Dr. Book worked
on statistical test design, analysis of test data,
and system optimization for a wide variety of
Air Force space programs. Prior to joining
Aerospace, Dr. Book was Professor of
Mathematics at California State University,
Dominguez Hills, where he conducted a
vigorous research program, in theoretical
aspects of probability and statistics, and he
continues to teach evening mathematics
courses. He earned his Ph.D. in mathematics,
with concentration in probability and
statistics, at the University of Oregon, Eugene,
in 1970.
Ms. Virginia Durgin Until her recent
retirement, Ms. Durgin served as the
Associate Deputy Director of the Office of
Finance and Logistics with the functional
responsibility of Procurement Executive for
the Central Intelligence Agency. She is an
expert in contracts, pricing, cost estimating,
analysis and procurement for the Central
Intelligence Agency. Ms. Durgin managed the
decentralized professional acquisition
workforce during the past six years of
downsizing while balancing increasing
requirements. In 1993, Ms. Durgin served on
the President's Advisory Committee for the
Redesign of the Space Station and specifically
worked on the Cost Subcommittee for cost
realism. In an earlier role at the CIA, Ms
Durgin initiated contracts for major
modernization programs in excess of 3 billion
dollars. Ms. Durgin is also the recipient of the
Distinguished Intelligence Medal from the
CIA.
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Mr. Michael Peters is currently a Senior Cost
Analyst for the Air Force Cost Analysis
Agency. In his current capacity, Mr. Peters
conducts life cycle cost analysis of major Air
Force space system acquisition programs. Mr.
Peters was responsible for the review of the
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)
Program and has also been involved in the
reviews of the National Polar Orbital
Environmental Satellite (NPOES); Space-
Based InfraRed Satellite (SBIRS); GPS II;
Milstar and Titan IV programs. He initiated
an ongoing cooperative effort between NASA
and the Air Force to develop a common space
systems cost database and methodology
applicable to estimating future space system
acquisition costs. Mr. Peters has conducted
definitive studies on the economics of space
development and the impacts of downsizing
on the aerospace industry.
Mr. Robert J. Polutchko recently retired as
the Vice President for Technical Operations,
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Sector. In this
position, he was responsible for the technical
management and oversight of all Aeronautics
Sector programs and activities, including
engineering, development, test, operations,
and research. He was named to this position
after serving as the Senior Vice President of
Technical Operations for the Martin Marietta
Corporation and Vice President of Technical
Operations of the Space Group. He has also
previously served as President of the Martin
Marietta Information Systems Group and Vice
President and General Manager of the Denver,
Space Electronics Division. He is currently
serving on a National Research Council panel
of the Aeronautics and Space Engineering
Board on long range R&D planning at NASA.
Mr. Polutchko is an elected Fellow of the
AIAA and received his B.S. and M.S. degrees
in Aeronautical and Astronautical Engineering
from M.I.T.
Mr. Eugene F. Toiman has an extensive
record of accomplishments and awards for
excellence in the Senior Executive Service of
the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Tolman
recently retired as Director of Technical
Operations. In this capacity he was
responsible for the formulation and
development of technical missions supporting
worldwide intelligence gathering and counter-
terrorist activities. He has also served as
Deputy Director for development of a major
National Reconnaissance Office collection
platform and Chief of Engineering of an
associated ground station. Currently, Mr.
Tolman is President of E. Forbes Tolman
Associates and Vice President of Technology
Applications for O-TECH International,
McLean, VA.
Task Force Support:
Daniel L. Hedin, Executive Secretary
F. Patton Eblen, Administrative
Susan Y. Edgington, Administrative
Sandie G. Horton, Administrative
Angela Clark-Williams, Administrative
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Appendix F: FY 1999 ISS Budget Submission to Congress
FY 1999 Budget to Congress
NOA$M
FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY0311 TOTAL
5PACE STATION CONTENT 2106.0 2112.9 2143.6 2148.6 2501.3 2270.0 2134.0 1933.0 1766.0 1546.0 20661.4
i
0£,XT.hI2E_ 1_1__ 12A9__ 1746.2 lS09.9 _ loss.s ss9.9 3ss.4 237.9 64.0 ].D.I_
Flight Hardware 1609.7 1319.9 1471.0 1540.7 1529.0 931.4 502.3 320.8 217.5 52.0 9494.3
Test, Manufacturing & Assembly 99.0 91.9 73.5 95.7 97.4 33.7 25.9 21.1 12.7 6.2 557.1
Operations Capability & Constructior 151.0 190.0 127.4 115.7 115.1 64.3 43.4 13-3 7.7 5.8 833.7
Transportation Support
Flight Technology Demonstrations
DPERATIONS
Vehicle Operations
Ground Operations
RESEARCH
Research Projects
Gravitational Biology and Ecology
Biomedical Research and Countermeasl
Advanced Human Support Technology
M icrogravity Research
Space Product Development
Engineering Technology
Earth Obser'vation Systems
Utilization Support
Flight Multi-User Hardware & Spt
Payload Integration & Operations
M ir Support
Phase I Project
Mir Research
CREW RETURN VEHICLE
58.5 117.6 63.5 55.7 47.0 26.1 18.3 0.2 386._
30.0 10.8 2.1 1.4 44"I
0.0 108.9 120.0 142.6 490.1 s40.3 9sl.6 ssl.s sos.1 763.9
36.2 37.5 33.5 312.4 574.8 659.2 573.1 501.6 492.9 3221.2
72.7 82.5 109.1 177.7 265.5 292.4 308.4 303.5 271.0 1882.1t
lST.s 2s4.6 277.4 196.1 221.3 374.2 47s.s szs.1 sso.o _
43.1 112.8 131.3 82.2
8.1 27.0 30.0 10.0
12.0 30.8 32.0 28.0
20.0 50.0 56.3 32.0
5.0 5.0
0.2
3.0 5.0 8.0 7.0
21.0 36.3 64.4 54.6
5.0 17.0 18.1
21.0 31.3 47.4 36.5
123.7 105.5 81.7 59.3
70.8 50.1 29.2 28.2
52.9 55.4 52.5 31./
95-3 232.2 353.5 418.2 438.0 433.1 2339.7
18.0 53.6 800 950 87.0 80.0 488.7
23.0 32.5 45.5 52.0 60.0 53.1 368.9
1.2 7.0 19,0 14.0 20.0 25.0 86.2
36.0 107.0 165.0 205.0 200.0 200.0 1071.3
I0.0 17.7 21,0 25.2 32.0 35,0 150,9
4.0 ] 1.0 19,0 25.0 37.0 40.0 136.2
3.1 3.4 4,0 2.0 2.0 37.5
89.0 140.0 122.0 106.9 112.0 120.0 866.2
33.0 54.0 42.0 33.0 37.0 40.0 279.1
56.0 86.0 80.0 73.9 75.0 80.0 587.1
37.0 2.0 409.2
21.0 199.3
16.0 2.0 209,9
US_.____SIAN COOP. CONTENT 100.0 100.0 100.0 300.0 50.0
IRUSSIAN _" -- I00.0 I00.0 I00.0 I00.0 400.01
[RUSSIAN PROGRAM ASSURANCE 200.0 50.0 250.04
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Appendix G: Revision C of ISS Assembly Sequence
Launch Flight
Date
Jun-98 1A/R
Jul-98 ?_.A
Dec-98 1R
Dec-98 ?_A.1
Jan-99 3A
Jan-99 2R
Apr-99 4A
May-99 5A
Jun-99 6A
Aug-99 7A
Phase 2 Complete
Nov-99 7A.t
Dec-99 4R
Jan-00 UF1
Feb-00 8A
Mar-00 UF2
Jun-00 9A
Jul-O0 9A.1
Oct-00 11A
NOV-00 12A
Dec-00 3R
Dec-00 5R
Mar-01 13A
Apr-01 10A
May-01 1J/A
Aug-01 tJ
Sep-01 UF3
Jan-02 UF4
Feb-02 2J/A
Feb-02 9R.1
May-02 9R.2
May-02 14A
Jun-02 UF5
Jul-02 20A
Aug-02 8R
Oct-02 1E
Nov-02 10R
Nov-02 17A
Jan-03 11R
Mar-03 12R
Mar-03 18A
Apt-03 19A
Jul-03 15A
Aug-03 UF6
Oct-03 UF7
Dec.-03 16A
Delivered Elements
FGB (Launched on PROTON launcher)
Node 1 (1 Stowage rack), PMA1, PMA,?., 2 APFRs (on Sidewalls)
Service Module (Launched on PROTON launcher)
Spacehab Double Cargo Module, OTD (on Sidewall)
Z1 truss, CMGs, Ku-band, S-band Equipment, PMA3, EVAS (on SLP), 2 Z1 DDCUs (on Sidewalls)
Soyuz - (a)
P6, PV Array (4 battery sets) / EEATCS radiators, S-band Equipment
Lab (5 Lab System racks), PDGF (on Sidewall)
6 Lab Sys, I Stowage rack, 2 RSPs (on MPLM), UHF, SSRMS (on SLP) - (b)
Airlock, HP gas (2 02, 2 N2) (on SLDP)
2 Stowage racks, 3 RSPs, ISPRs (on MPLM TBR9), OTD, APFR (on Sidewalls), 2 PV battery sets (on SLP:
Docking Compartment 1 (DC1)
ISPRs, 2 Stowage racks, 3 RSPs (on MPLM), Maintenance ORUs (on SLP)
S0, MT, GPS, Umbilicals, ML Spur
ISPRs, 1 JEM rack, 3 Stowage racks (on MPLM), MBS, Radiator OSE, PDGF (on Sidewalls)
St (3 rads), TCS, CETA (1), S-band
Science Power Platform w/4 solar arrays and ERA.
P1 (3 rads), TCS, CETA (1), UHF
P3/4, PV Array (4 battery sets), 2 ULCAS
Universal Docking Module (UDM)
Docking Compartment 2 (DC2)
$3/4, PV Array (4 battery sets), 4 PAS
Node 2 (4 DDCU racks), NTA (on Sidewall)
JEM ELM PS (4 JEM Sys, 3 ISPRs, 1 JEM Stowage racks), P5, 1 02 Tank (on SLP)
JEM PM (4 JEM Sys racks), JEM RMS
ISPRs, I Stowage Rack, 1 RSP (on MPLM)
Truss Attach Site P/L, Express Pallet w/Payloads, ATA, 1 02 tank, SPDM (on Spacelab Pallet)
JEM EF, ELM-ES w/Payloads, 4 PV battery sets (on Spacelab Pallet)
Docking & Stowage Module 1 (DSM1)
Docking & Stowage Module 2 (DSM2)
4 SPP Solar Arrays (on EI)O truss), Cupola (on SLP), Port Rails (on SLP)
ISPRs, 1 Stowage Rack, 1RSP (on MPLM), Express Pallet w/Payloads
Node 3 (2 Avionics, 2 ECLSS racks)
Research Module #1 (RM-1)
APM (5 ISPRs), 1 02 tank (on SLP)
Research Module #2 (RM-2)
1 Lab Sys, 4 Node 3 Sys racks, 3 CHeCS racks, 1 U.S. Stowage rack, ISPRs (on MPLM)
Life Support Module 1 (LSM 1 )
Life Support Module 2 (LSM 2)
CRV #1, CRV adapter - (c)
5 Stowage racks, 1 RSR, ISPRs, 4 Crew Qtrs. (on MPLM), $5 - (d)
$6, PV Array (4 battery sets), S1bd MT/CETA rails
3 RSRs, 1 RSP, ISPRs (on MPLM), 2 PV battery sets (on SLP)
Centrifuge Accommodations Module (CAM), ISPRs (TBD)
Hab (3 Hab sys racks, 2 RSRs, ISPRs)
Additional logistics vehicles are not listed.
(a) - 3 Person Permanent International Human Presence Capability
(b) - Microgravity Capability
(c) - 6 Person Permanent International Human Presence Capability
(d) - Rack traffic assumes transition to 6 person crew on 19A.
53
Appendix G: Revision C of ISS Assembly Sequence (continued)
1A/R 2A
Conffol Module Node I a_[ prescribed
Mating/_lagg'rs 1 aad 2
5A 6A
1R 2A. 1 3A 2R 4A
"_ :" "" lategrAredTn_Stn_ure -
Scfv_cc Module t.ogi_aicsFligla (S!_.t, tb) (ITS) Zl, PMA-3. Comm_ SoyuzControl Momcat Gyros ITS P6 (Power aad Thermal)
U.S. Lab M_ti-t'_aWsc _gis_ Modt_c (MPLM)
(Lab outfn0ng flight). _.. a_ Space
Station Remote Mani!_aimmg system
7A 7A. 1 4R UF 1
, Payload Racks
Joiat Aidonk aad High Logiszics Flight(MPLM) Docking Compare'nero _ (MPLM} aad Power
PresStlm GaS As._mbly
8A UF2 9A 9A. 1 11A 12A
ITS SO and Mobile Tra_porter Paytoad & Lab System ITS S |Tl_rmal Russiatt Science Power Platform ITS Pl (Tim.final) ITS P'3/P4 (Power)
Racks (MPLM) with 4. Arrays
3R 5R 13A 10A 1J/A 1J
" Node 2 _ Nitrogca Japanese LOgiSL_CS Module.
Universal Docking Modul¢ Docking Compartment 2 ITS $31S4 (Pow_') Tank As_mbly [TS PS. High ISremm_ 02 tanks Jalmncse Lab
UF3 UF4 2J/A 9R. 1 ....7 9R.2
,- _. _ ' _i
Payload Racks (MPLM) ARachc_ Paylond Sacs ]apantsc Extm'aal Fa_lity, Power Donkmg and 5towag_ Module- I Docking and Stowage Module-2
14A UF5 20A 8R 1E
"' "_ _ " _ "g; _ RcscarchModu]e I Em'opcan Lab
Cupola and 4 Scmnc¢ Payload Racks (MPLM) Node 3
Po.=_o,_ _._ys 18A
10R 17A 11R 12R .
. . ,..,;. • _ -
,_ _ _"_
Research Module 2 Outfitting Flight Life SuppOrt Modgle 1 Life Sup_¢. Motktt¢ 2 Crew Return v¢1_c1¢
19A 15A -. UF6 UF7 16A
_. • " _,_:r-... .: " _
Outfitting Fli_,_. Crew Quart_ ITS $6 (Power) Payload Ra_ (MPLM) Centrifuge Accomodalions Module LI.S. Habitation Module
March 25,1998
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Appendix H: Acronyms
AC
ACISS
ATV
BCDU
C&DH
C&T
CAV
CAM
CITE
COF
CRV
CSA
CSCI
DCMC
DDCU
ECLSS
EMC
EPS
ESA
EVA
FEL
FGB
FrE
FY
GDR
GFE
GN&C
GPS
Assembly Complete
Advisory Committee on the ISS
Automated Transfer Vehicle
Battery Charge/Discharge Unit
Command & Data Handling
Communications and Tracking
Cost Assessment and
Validation
Centrifuge Accommodation
Module
Cargo Integration Test
Equipment
Columbus Orbital Facility
Crew Return Vehicle
Canadian Space Agency
Computer Software/system
Configuration Item
Defense Contract Management
Command
DC-to-DC Converter Unit
Environmental Control and Life
Support System
ElectroMagnetic Compatibility
Electrical Power System
European Space Agency
ExtraVehicular Activity
First Element Launch
Functional Cargo Block [sic]
(Functionalui Germaticheskii
Block)
Full Time Equivalent person
Fiscal Year
General Designers Review
Government-Furnished
Equipment
Guidance, Navigation, and
Control
Global Positioning System
HTV
ICM
IGA
IMCA
Assembly
ISS
JSC
KSC
KHSC
MDM
MElT
MOU
MPLM
MSFC
MTBF
NAC
NASA
NRL
NSLD
NPLD
ORU
PHC
POP
RPA
RSA
RSS
SDOM
SE&I
SM
SPP
STA
H-II Transfer Vehicle
Interim Control Module
Inter-Governmental Agreement
Integrated Motor Control
Intemational Space Station
Johnson Space Center
Kennedy Space Center
Khrunichev State Research and
Production Space Center
Multiplexer/DeMultiplexer
Multi-Element Integrated Test
Memorandum of Understanding
Multi-Purpose Logistics
Module
Marshall Space Flight Center
Mean Time Between Failures
NASA Advisory Council
National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
Naval Research Laboratory
NASA/Shuttle Logistics Depot
National Payload Logistics
Depot
Orbital Replacement Unit
Permanent Human Capability
Program Operating Plan
Russian Program Assurance
Russian Space Agency
Root-Sum-Square
Station Development and
Operations Meeting
Systems Engineering and
Integration
Service Module
Science Power Platform
Structural Test Article
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